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Abstract
We consider revenue maximization problem in banner advertisements under two fun-
damental concepts: Envy-freeness and truthfulness. Envy-freeness captures fairness
requirement among buyers while truthfulness gives buyers the incentive to announce
truthful private bids. A extension of envy-freeness named competitive equilibrium, which
requires both envy-freeness and market clearance conditions, is also investigated. For
truthfulness also called incentive compatible, we adapt Bayesian settings, where each
buyer’s private value is drawn independently from publicly known distributions. There-
fore, the truthfulness we adopt is Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms.
Most of our results are positive. We study various settings of revenue maximizing
problem e.g. competitive equilibrium and envy-free solution in relaxed demand, sharp
demand and consecutive demand case; Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in
relaxed demand, sharp demand, budget constraints and consecutive demand cases. Our
approach allows us to argue that these simple mechanisms give optimal or approximate-
optimal revenue guarantee in a very robust manner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Arguably, online advertising has been the most successful new business enabled through
the World Wide Web. At the same time as it has grown to a modern media realm and
as it has evidenced the feasibility of Internet monetization, it has also been relied on as a
major, and sometimes the primary, source of financing to fuel the creations of thousands
of new Internet services. According to the Internet Advertising Bureau [47], the online
ad annual revenues hit $31 Billion in 2011. Moreover, the internet advertising revenues
of the first half year of 2012 continued to reach a new height of $17 billion, representing
a 14 percent increase year-on-year [48].
How to price the online advertisement has been a central problem in the important
industry. The search engine based advertising model, the sponsored search auction, has
been extensively studied in the literatures since the pioneer work of Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz [28], as well as Varian [57], in the context of position auction, especially
on the generalized second price auction (GSP). Here each position for placing an ad is
associated with a quality value representing the prominence of the position for search
engine users to be attracted to click on it. On the other hand, each advertiser is as-
sociated with a value related to its potential gains from the attracted users because of
its profitability and possibly the attractiveness of its ad design. The product of the two
factors is used to decide on the placement and to price the ads by the GSP protocol
and created a success for the future designers of the Internet advertisement model to
emulate.
It is difficult to fully carry over the success of the sponsored search model to many
other settings of advertisement. One problem is caused by the use of banner ads which
may require more than one slot which was used by a single ad in the text mode. How
to allocate and price ads of different sizes efficiently to match up to the success of the
GSP protocol in placing the text ads in the sponsored search model is an important
challenge in the new form of advertisement. In banner advertisement other display-
related advertisement mode, a banner is often priced under the CPM (cost per thousand
impression) scheme based on bringing up the ads to webpage users impressions. Their
1
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market share has been steadily increasing. In 2011, 35 percent online advertisement
income came from the display-related advertising sector [47].
Such Internet banner advertising can involve various elements of mixed media, now
ranging from texts and graphics to streaming audios and videos. Hence, demand is a
practical consideration. Advertisers are granted options to choose the proper way to
display their own ads, which may occupy more than one slot for the traditional text ads,
which can be formulated as sharp/consecutive models. Subsequently, the Web designer
has to address the problem of how to display ads with distinct sizes and as a market
maker, to devise an allocation and pricing rule to increase her/his own revenue. There
may be different values (per unit slot) associated with those different types and sizes of
ads.
Another motivation of our study of banner ads on matching market comes from TV
advertising where inventories of a commercial break are usually divided into slots of sev-
eral seconds each, and slots have various qualities measuring their expected number of
viewers and corresponding attraction. We may have a longer ad of 3 slots or a short one
with simply one slot. Advancing into multiple choices of multi-slot ads from every ad-
vertiser, it has made obsolete the nice structures developed in the GSP auction protocol.
In banner (or newspaper) advertising, advertisers may request different sizes or areas for
their displayed ads, which may be decomposed into a number of base units. Some ad-
vertisers may only care about how many areas of ads displayed without concerning any
other things, which can be formulated as sharp demand models. The relaxed demand
model can be directly used to classic text ads in sponsored search advertisement.
In this thesis we develop new algorithmic insight to design a methodology for efficient
pricing mechanisms to achieve social optimality and to extract optimum revenue.
1.1.1 Our Modeling Approach
We have a set of buyers (advertisers) and a set of items to be sold (the ad slots on a
web page). We address the challenge of computing prices that satisfy certain desirable
properties. Next we describe the elements of the model in more details.
• Items. Our model considers the geometric organization of the ad slots, which
commonly has the slots arranged in some sequence (typically, from top to bottom
in the right-hand side of a web page). The slots are of variable quality. In the
study of sponsored search auctions, a standard assumption is that the quality
(corresponding to click-through rate) is highest at the beginning of the sequence
and then monotonically decreases. Here we consider a generalization where the
quality may go down and up, subject to a limit on the total number of local maxima
(which we call peaks), corresponding to focal points on the web page. As we will
show later in some pricing model, without this limit the revenue maximization
problem is NP-hard.
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• Buyers. A buyer (advertiser) may want to purchase multiple slots, so as to display
a larger ad. We will consider various case of demand models. Thus, consider each
buyer i has a fixed demand di, which is the number of slots she needs for her ad.
Three important aspects of this are
– relaxed multi-unit demand, where buyer i can buy the number of slots up to
di
– sharp multi-unit demand, referring to the fact that buyer i should be allocated
di items, or none at all; there is no point in allocating any fewer
– consecutive demand for the allocated items, where buyer i is allocated di
consecutive slots or nothing.
These constraints give rise to new and interesting combinatorial pricing problems.
• Valuations. We assume that each buyer i has a parameter vi representing the
value she assigns to a slot of unit quality. Valuations for multiple slots are additive,
so that a buyer with demand di would value a block or discrete sequence of di
slots to be their total quality, multiplied by vi. This valuation model has been
considered by Edelman et al. [28] and Varian [57] in their seminal work for keywords
advertising.
This scenario of sharp and consecutive demand captures some similarity but is still
quite different from single-minded buyers (i.e., each one desires a fixed combination of
items).
Pricing mechanisms. Given the valuations and demands from the buyers, the
market maker decides on a price vector for all slots and an allocation of slots to buyers,
as an output of the market. The question is one of which output the market maker
should choose to achieve certain objectives. We consider three approaches:
• Truthful mechanism whereby the buyers report their demands and values to
the market maker; then prices are set in such a way as to ensure that the buyers
have the incentive to report their true valuations. We give a revenue-maximizing
approach (i.e., maximizing the total price paid), within this framework.
• Envy-free solution whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices so as
to guarantee each buyer is envy-free (fairness), as explained below.
• Competitive equilibrium whereby we prescribe certain constraints on the prices
so as to guarantee certain well-known notions of fairness and efficiency, as explained
in Chapter 2.
The mechanisms we exhibit are computationally efficient.
Regarding the design of truthful mechanisms, the point here is that the value vi
of each buyer i is initially private information of that buyer. Truthful market design
relies on the general revelation principle [50] to simplify the search for mechanisms with
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desirable properties, such as one that brings in the maximum revenue. Therefore, it is
natural for us to consider market mechanisms that bring in the optimum revenue, while
ensuring the participants’ incentives to reveal the truth about their private values. Some
of the work is in a Bayesian setting, which assumes some prior knowledge of a buyer’s
value, represented by a probability distribution over her possible values. We exhibit a
Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism that always extracts the maximal revenue in
expectation.
Note that the private information about the value for each advertiser creates an
asymmetry among the participants and the market maker. Truthful market design
relies on the general revelation principle [50] to simplify the search for mechanisms
with desirable properties, such as one that brings in the maximum revenue. Therefore,
assuming some prior knowledge about advertisers’ valuations, in most of the cases, we
propose a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism that always extracts the maximal
revenue in expectation.
While truthful mechanisms rule out the possibility of buyers’ deviations, it might
produce the price discrimination phenomenon that causes discontent among users and
lures the arbitrage behavior. If we insist on truthful markets, the unfair auction is
the only possibility [20, 33]. Market equilibrium (Competitive equilibrium) offers an
alternative which offers a sense of fairness to all customers in terms of that no one would
prefer to shift to another allocation under the current price vector. Further, all goods are
sold, and otherwise priced at zero (market clearance) which none would improve their
utility taking those in. In fact, all market participants have maximized their utilities
with their allocation under the current price vector.
As one of the central solution concepts in economics, competitive equilibrium has
been studied and applied in a variety of domains [49]. In particular, we show that, when
pricing with sharp/consecutive demand buyers, competitive equilibrium may not exist;
even if an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, a maximum equilibrium (in which each
price is as high as it can be in any solution) may not exist. Thus, we design an algorithm
that determines the existence of an equilibrium, and computes a revenue maximizing
one if it does.
While (revenue maximizing) competitive equilibrium has a number of nice economic
properties and has been recognized as an elegant tool for the analysis of competitive
markets, its possible non-existence largely ruins its applicability. Such non-existence is
a result of the market clearance condition required in the equilibrium (i.e., unallocated
items have to be priced at zero). In most applications, however, especially in advertising
markets, market makers are able to manage the amount of supplies. For instance, in TV
advertising, publishers can ‘freely’ adjust the length of a commercial break. Therefore,
the market clearance condition becomes arguably unnecessary in those applications.
This motivates the study of envy-free pricing (here envy-free pricing we mean relaxed or
sharp or consecutive or bundle envy-free pricing [32]) which only requires the fairness
condition in the competitive equilibrium, where no buyer can get a larger utility from
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any other allocation for the given prices. In contrast with competitive equilibrium,
an envy-free solution always exists (a trivial one is obtained by setting all prices to
∞). Once again, taking the interests of both sides of the market into account, revenue
maximizing envy-free pricing is a natural solution concept that can be applied in those
marketplaces.
The study of algorithmic computation of revenue maximizing envy-free pricing was
initiated by Guruswami et al. [39], where the authors considered two special settings with
unit demand buyers and single-minded buyers and showed that a revenue maximizing
envy-free pricing is NP-hard to compute. Because envy-free pricing has applications
in various settings and efficient computation is a critical condition for its applicability,
there is a surge of studies on its computational issues since the pioneering work of [39],
mainly focusing on approximation solutions and special cases that admit polynomial
time algorithms, e.g., [4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 18, 29, 34, 37, 40].
The NP-hardness result of [39] for unit demand buyers implies that we cannot hope
for a polynomial time algorithm for general vij valuations in the multi-unit demand
setting, even for the very special case when one has positive values for at most three
items [14]. However, it does not rule out positive computational results for special, but
important, cases of multi-unit demand. For viqj valuations with multi-unit demand,
where the hardness reductions of [14, 39] does not apply.
Despite the recent surge in the studies of algorithmic pricing, multi-unit demand
models have not received much attention. Most previous work has focused on two
simple special settings: unit demand and single-minded buyers, but arguably multi-unit
demand has much more applicability. While the relaxed demand model shares similar
properties to unit demand (e.g., existence, solution structure, and computation), the
sharp/consecutive demand model has a number of features that unit demand does not
possess.
• Existence of equilibrium. In unit or relaxed demand (viqj) case, the competitive
equilibrium always exists, moreover, the maximum and minimum equilibrium al-
ways exists. As discussed above, a competitive equilibrium may not exist in the
sharp/consecutive demand model. Further, even if a solutions exist, the solution
space may not form a distributive lattice.
• Over-priced items. In unit-demand, the price pj of any item j is always at most the
value vij of the corresponding winner i. This no longer holds for sharp multi-unit
demand. Specifically, even if pj > vij , buyer i may still want to get j since his net
profit from other items may compensate his loss from item j (see Example 2.2.4)1.
This property enlarges the solution space and adds an extra challenge to finding
a revenue maximizing solution.
1This phenomenon does occur in our real life. For example, in most travel packages offered by travel
agencies, they could lose money for some specific programs; but their overall net profit could always be
positive.
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Our main results in this thesis are summarized in the following table (Table 1.1), where
RM denotes revenue maximization.
RM Relaxed Demand Sharp Demand Consecutive Demand With Budget
NP-hard
Bayesian
P solved P solved
(arbitrary peak)
2-Approx
Auction P solved
(constant peak)
NP-hard
Competitive
P solved P solved
(arbitrary peak)
Unkown
Equilibrium P solved
(constant peak)
NP-hard NP-hard
Envy-free
P solved
(arbitrary demand) (same qualities)
Unkown
Solution P solved P solved
(constant demand) (same demand)
Table 1.1: Summary of main results of this thesis
1.2 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. We begin in Chapter 2 with a detailed description
of our banner ads model and the related solution concepts. In Chapter 3, we study
the problem in Bayesian model and provide a Bayesian Incentive Compatible Auction
with optimal expected revenue for the special case of the single peak in quality values of
advertisement positions. Then we extend it to the general case of multiple peaks/valleys
in the same section, for multiple peaks the problem is shown to be NP-hard. Next, in
Chapter 4, we turn to the prior-free model and propose an algorithm to compute the
competitive equilibrium with maximum revenue. Finally, we present results related to
various envy-free concepts in Chapter 5. The simulation is presented in Section 6.
1.3 Related Works
This thesis merges three work [17, 23? ]. A study on search based text ads and display
based multi-media ads was conducted by Li and Li [46] to explore their profitabilities.
Hunter discussed experimental results identifying factors that affect the prices of banner
ads [56], for three types of ad size: 1 slot (mini), 2 slots (standard) and 6 lots (hi-rise).
The theoretical study of position auction (of 1 slot) under the generalized second price
auction was initiated in [28, 57]. There has been a series of studies of position auctions in
deterministic settings [45]. Our consideration of position auctions in the Bayesian setting
fits in the general one dimensional auction design framework. Our study considers
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continuous distributions on buyers’ values. For discrete distribution, [10] presents an
optimal mechanism for budget constrained buyers without demand constraints in multi-
parameter settings and very recently they also give a general reduction from revenue
to welfare maximization in [11]; for buyers with both budget constraints and demand
constraints, 2-approximate mechanisms [1] and 4-approximate mechanisms [6] exist in
the literature.
There are extensive studies on multi-unit demand in economics, see, e.g., [3, 12, 30].
While our study for relaxed demand model shares the similar property of unit demand
model where it is well known that the set of competitive equilibrium prices is non-empty
and forms a distributive lattice [38, 55]. This immediately implies the existence of an
equilibrium with maximum possible prices; hence, revenue is maximized. Demange,
Gale, and Sotomayor [21] proposed a combinatorial dynamics which always converges
to a revenue maximizing (or minimizing) equilibrium for unit demand. However, Our
study on sharp/consecutive demand buyers exhibit different structure property as unit
demand model.
From an algorithmic point of view, the problem of revenue maximization in envy-free
pricing was initiated by Guruswami et al. [39], who showed that computing an optimal
envy-free pricing is APX-hard for unit-demand bidders and gave an O(log n) approx-
imation algorithm. Briest [8] showed that given appropriate complexity assumptions,
the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem in general cannot be approximated within
O(log n) for some  > 0. Hartline and Yan [41] characterized optimal envy-free pricing
for unit-demand and showed its connection to mechanism design. Recently, Devanur,
Ha and Hartline generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from [41] to set-
tings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare
and revenue, and give prior-free mechanisms that approximate these benchmarks [27].
For the multi-unit demand setting, Chen et al. [18] gave an O(logD) approximation
algorithm when there is a metric space behind all items, where D is the maximum de-
mand, and Briest [8] showed that the problem is hard to approximate within a ratio of
O(n) for some , unless NP ⊆ ⋂>0BPTIME(2n). It should be noticed that recent
work by M, Feldman et al studies envy-free revenue maximization problem with budget
but without demand constraints and present a 2-approximate mechanism for envy-free
pricing problem [32]. Another stream of research is on single-minded bidders, including,
for example, [4, 5, 9, 19, 29, 39]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study
algorithmic computation of multi-unit demand.
Several works in the literature also made an effort to model online advertising [7, 31,
53]. However their focus on the design of expressive auctions and clearing algorithms
is substantially different from this work. In their work, the advertisers’ consecutive
demand are not taken into consideration. Deng et al., had a study on the problem for
the VCG protocol, and various GSP type protocols, together with a simulated study [25].
However, it only works in the special case of the sponsored search model where the slots
are usually ranked from top to bottom in a decreasing order of their quality scores.
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It should be noticed that, besides the research on banner advertisements, we also
have some work [24] on Bayesian double auctions, which are motivated from mechanism-
s of groupon. In [24], optimal mechanisms or constant approximate mechanisms are
presented in various settings, e.g. single dimension versus multi dimension, continuous
distribution versus discrete distribution, supply limit versus demand limit. Double auc-
tion paradigm can be viewed as an extension of our Bayesian setting work in Chapter
3 from single side bidding market to two sides bidding market. The double auction
design problem becomes more complicated compared to single side auction since the
market maker acts as the middle man to bring buyers and sellers together. A guide to
the literature in micro-economics on this topic can be found in [35]. The profit maxi-
mization problem for the single buyer/single seller setting has been studied by Myerson
and Satterthwaite [52]. Our optimal double auction is a direct extension of their work
and, to our best knowledge, fills a clear gap in the economic theory of double auctions.
Deshmukh et al. [26], studied the revenue maximization problem for double auctions
when the auctioneer has no prior knowledge about bids. Their prior-free model is es-
sentially different from ours. More auction mechanism design problems were studied by
many researchers in recent years, but as far as we know, not in the context of optimal
double auction design in the Bayesian setting. The most related one is by Jain and
Wilkens [43], where they studied the market intermediation problem in a setting with a
single unit-demand buyer and a group of sellers. They gave several constant approximate
mechanism with various buyer behaviour assumptions. While our setting assumes the
existence of a monopoly platform, Rochet and Tirole [54] and Armstrong [2] introduced
several different models for two-sided markets and studied platform competition.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In our model, a banner advertisement instance consists of n advertisers andm advertising
slots (with same size) that are lined up in a line. Each slot is characterized by a number
qj which can be viewed as the quality or desirability of the slot. Each advertiser (or
buyer) i wants to display his own ad on the webpage, which may occupy slots in three
different demand types:
• relaxed demand where buyers can occupy the number of slots up to di;
• sharp demand where buyers occupy di not necessarily consecutive slots or nothing;
• consecutive demand where buyers occupy consecutive di slots or nothing.
In addition, each buyer has a private number vi representing her valuation and thus,
the ith buyer’s value for item j is vij = viqj . In other words, the valuation matrix for n
buyers and m items is the outer product of the vectors v = (vi)i and q = (qj)j . We use
slot and item interchangeably if there is no confusion. Let K be the number of distinct
values in the set {v1, . . . , vn}. Let A1, . . . , AK be a partition of all buyers where each
Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, contains the set of buyers that have the kth largest value.
The vector of all the buyers’ values is denoted by v or sometimes (vi; v−i) where
v−i is the joint bids of all bidders other than i. Let V denote the state space or the
distribution of v if there is no confusion. We represent a feasible assignment by a vector
x = (xij)i,j , where xij ∈ {0, 1} is simply the indicator variable where xij = 1 denotes
item j is assigned to buyer i. Thus we have
∑
i xij ≤ 1 for every item j. Given a fixed
assignment x, we use ti to denote the (expected) total quality of items that buyer i is
assigned, precisely, ti =
∑
j qjxij . In general, when x is a function of buyers’ bids v, we
define ti to be a function of v such that ti(v) =
∑
j qjxij(v).
Throughout this thesis, we will often say that slot j is assigned to a buyer set B to
denote that j is assigned to some buyer in B. We will call the set of all slots assigned
to B the allocation to B. In addition, a buyer will be called a winner if he succeeds
in displaying his ad and a loser otherwise. We use the standard notation [s] to denote
the set of integers from 1 to s, i.e. [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. We sometimes use ∑i instead
9
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of
∑
i∈[n] to denote the summation over all buyers and
∑
j instead of
∑
j∈[m] for items,
and the terms Ev and Ev−i are short for Ev∈V and Ev−i∈V−i .
We also introduce a special case of the revenue maximizing problem of banner ad-
vertisement. In that case, the qualities of items are single peaked structured illustrated
in Figure 2.1. That is, there exists a peak slot k such that for any slot j < k on the left
side of k, qj ≥ qj−1 and for any slot j > k on the right side of k, qj ≥ qj+1. In Bayesian
settings, we will study this single peak case in Section 3.5 and show how to handle the
general case in Section 3.6. Similarly, we say the qualities of items with constant peak
if the number of peaks formed by qualities of items is bounded by a constant.
5
3
2
4
1
Slots
Qualities
Peak
   
Figure 2.1: A case with qualities {1,4,5,3,2}
2.1 Bayesian Mechanism Design
In Chapter 3, we consider the revenue maximization problem of the above banner ad-
vertisement instances in the context of mechanism design. Mechanism design studies
algorithmic procedures where the input data is not always objective but reported from
selfish agents. Following the work of [51], we consider this problem in a Bayesian setting
where the seller has a prior knowledge about the buyers’ distribution of valuations. This
has been shown to be a standard assumption if one wants to optimize the auctioneer’s
revenue. The auctioneer holds the set of items that can be sold, but does not know the
(true) valuations of these items for different buyers. Each buyer is a selfish entity, that
privately knows her own valuation for each item (which constitutes its type). Obviously,
a strategic buyer may choose to misreport her valuations, which are private, in order
to increase her utility, i.e. the valuation of assigned item minus her payment. Since we
only consider the auction setting, we may use auction and mechanism interchangeably
when there is no ambiguity.
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We consider direct-revelation mechanisms: each buyer reports her valuation, and the
reported valuation needs to be the same as the buyer’s true valuation. The mechanism
then computes a feasible assignment and charges the players (i.e., buyers) the payment
for the items they have been assigned. An auction M thus consists of a tuple (X,p),
where X specifies the allocation of items and p = (pi)i specifies the buyers’ payments
where both X and p are functions of the reported valuations v. Thus, the expected
revenue of the mechanism is Rev(M) = Ev [
∑
i pi(v)] where Ev denotes the expectation
with respect to components of v sampled from their respective distributions. From
the viewpoint of a single buyer i with private value vi, her expected utility is given by
Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)]. The goal of an auctioneer is to maximize her expected revenue;
a buyer i is however only interested in maximizing her own expected utility, and may
declare a false value if this could increase her utility. The mechanism therefore needs
to incentivize the buyers/players to truthfully reveal their values. This is made precise
using the notion of Bayesian Incentive Compatibility.
Definition 2.1.1 (Bayesian Incentive Compatible). A mechanism M is called Bayesian
Incentive Compatible (BIC) iff the following inequalities hold for all i, vi, v
′
i.
Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)] ≥ Ev−i
[
viti(v
′
i; v−i)− pi(v′i; v−i)
]
(2.1)
Besides, we say M is Incentive Compatible if M satisfies a stronger condition that
viti(v)− pi(v) ≥ viti(v′i; v−i)− pi(v′i; v−i), for all v, i, v′i,
To put it in words, in a BIC mechanism, no player can improve her expected utility
(expectation taken over other players’ bids) by misreporting her value. An IC mechanism
satisfies the stronger requirement that no matter what the other players declare, no
player has incentives to deviate.
In the Bayesian setting, we also assume all buyers’ values are distributed indepen-
dently according to publicly known bounded distributions and also the valuations have
known upper and lower bounds, i.e. vi ∈ [vi, vi] and v ∈ V =
∏
i[vi, vi]. The distri-
bution of each buyer is represented by a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Fi
and a Probability Density Function (PDF) fi. In addition, we assume that the concave
closure or convex closure or integration of those functions can be computed efficiently.
We assume the buyers are self-interested and rational, thus, each buyer’s expected
utility is non negative.
Definition 2.1 (Individual Rationality). A mechanism M is called ex-interim Individual
Rational (IR) iff the following inequalities hold for all i, vi.
Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)] ≥ 0 (2.2)
If viti(v)− pi(v) ≥ 0 for all v, i, we say M is ex-post Individual Rational.
Obviously, an ex-post Individual Rational mechanism must be ex-interim Individual
Rational. The term “ex-interim” here indicates the non-negativity of each agent’s utility
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holds for every possible valuation of this agent, averaged over the possible valuations of
the other agents. Ex-post IR holds if and only if the utility of each player cannot be
negative for any bidding profile v.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium and Envy-freeness
In Chapters 4 and 5, we study the revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium and envy-
free solution in the full information setting and Bayesian setting respectively. Various
concepts of envy-free solution and competitive equilibrium will be investigated. When
studying competitive equilibrium, we can make item-wise pricing, that is setting a price
for each advertising slot. When studying envy-freeness, we can do both item pricing and
bundle pricing (only the bundle of the items is priced). More precisely, an outcome of
the market is a tuple (X,p), where
• X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is an allocation vector, where Xi is the set of items that i wins.
If Xi 6= ∅, we say i is a winner and have Xi is a set with no more than di items or
exactly di items, which depends on the concept we’ll investigate. Precisely, if the
winner is relaxed demand, Xi is a set of items containing no more than di items; if
the winner is sharp demand, then Xi is a set of items containing exactly di items;
otherwise, if the winner is consecutive demand, Xi is a set of items containing
consecutive di items. If Xi = ∅, i does not win any items and we say i is a loser.
Further, since every item has unit supply, we require Xi ∩Xi′ = ∅ for any i 6= i′.
• p = (p1, . . . , pm) ≥ 0 is a price vector, where pj is the price charged for item j, we
also use pi denote the payment of buyer i if there is no confusion;
Given an output (X,p), recall vij = viqj , let ui(X,p) denote the utility of i. That
is, if Xi 6= ∅, then ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj); if Xi = ∅, then ui(X,p) = 0.
As mentioned above, in addition to the efficiency (market clearance) condition where
every unsold item is priced at zero, the competitive equilibrium also provide a “free
market” where buyers always pick their favorite bundles. This property is also called
envy-freeness or fairness in the literature of Economics and Computer Science. We
present various concepts of envy-freeness as follows. First, we consider relaxed envy-
freeness concept, which means the buyer would not envy the bundle of items up to his
demand.
Definition 2.2.1 (Relaxed Envy-free Pricing). We say a tuple (X,p) is an relaxed
envy-free pricing solution if every buyer is relaxed envy-free, where a buyer i is relaxed
envy-free if the following conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) |Xi| ≤ di ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ 0, and (ii) for any other
subset of items T with |T | ≤ di, ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj);
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• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of items T with |T | ≤ di,∑
j∈T
(vij − pj) ≤ 0.
The sharp envy-free concept are presented in the following.
Definition 2.2.2 (Sharp Envy-free Pricing). We say a tuple (X,p) is an sharp envy-free
pricing solution if every buyer is sharp envy-free, where a buyer i is sharp envy-free if
the following conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) Xi is a set of exactly di items. ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ 0,
and (ii) for any other subset of items T with |T | = di, ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥∑
j∈T
(vij − pj);
• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of items T with |T | = di,∑
j∈T
(vij − pj) ≤ 0.
And consecutive envy-free is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.3 (Consecutive Envy-free Pricing). We say a tuple (X,p) is an consec-
utive envy-free pricing solution if every buyer is consecutive envy-free, where a buyer i
is consecutive envy-free if the following conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) Xi is di consecutive items w.r.t. a given total order on the
items. ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ 0, and (ii) for any other subset of consecutive
items T with |T | = di, ui(X,p) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj);
• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of consecutive items T with
|T | = di,
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj) ≤ 0.
Before defining (relaxed) bundle envy-free pricing, we will use the notation vi(T )
to denote the valuation of buyer i for a bundle T , which is given by vi(T ) =
∑
j∈T vij
if |T | ≤ di and vi(T ) = maxT ′{
∑
j∈T ′ vij |T ′ ⊂ T, |T ′| ≤ di}, otherwise. We make
clarification that
Definition 2.2.4 (Bundle Envy-free Pricing). We say a tuple (p,X) is an bundle envy-
free pricing solution if every buyer is bundle envy-free, where a buyer i is bundle envy-free
if the following conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) ui(p,X) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ 0, and (ii) for any other bundle Xj
received by buyer j, ui(p,X) =
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) ≥ vi(Xj)−
∑
k∈Xj pk;
• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any bundle Xj obtained by buyer j,
vi(Xj)−
∑
k∈Xj pk ≤ 0.
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To be precise, the above definition of bundle envy-freeness should be called relaxed
bundle envy-freeness. If we change the definition of vi(T ) to be the maximum value
among all the subsets of T with size exactly di or among all consecutive di subsets,
we can similarly get sharp bundle envy-free and consecutive bundle envy-free concept.
We use notations bundle envy-free pricing to denote one of relaxed/sharp/consecutive
bundle envy-free concepts if the definition is clear in the corresponding settings. It is
not difficult to see that differences among these envy-free concepts are that the set of
items the buyer envy is different, e.g. relaxed envy-freeness indicates that the buyer
would not envy any set with the number of items no more than the buyer’s demand.
Envy-freeness captures fairness in the market e.g. for consecutive envy-free pricing, the
utility of everyone is maximized at the corresponding allocation for the given prices.
That is, if i wins a consecutive subset Xi, then i cannot obtain a higher utility from
any other consecutive subset of the same size; if i does not win anything, then i cannot
obtain a positive utility from any consecutive subset with size di. It is easy to see that
envy-free solutions always exists (e.g., set all prices to be ∞ and allocate nothing to
every buyer).
Given the definition of above various envy-free concepts, it is interesting to see the
inclusion relationship among them. By their definitions we have the following inclusion
relationships:
relaxed envy-free ⇒ (relaxed) bundle envy-free,
sharp envy-free ⇒ (sharp) bundle envy-free,
consecutive envy-free⇒ (consecutive) bundle envy-free.
Example 2.2.1 (Four types of envy-freeness). Suppose there are two buyers i1 and i2
with values per unit of quality vi1 = 10, vi2 = 8 and di1 = 1, di2 = 2. The item j1, j2,
j3 with quality as qj1 = qj3 = 1 and qj2 = 3. By fundamental calculations, the optimal
solutions of the three types of envy-freeness are as follows:
• Optimal relaxed envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j2}, Xi2 = {j1, j3} and pj1 = pj3 = 8
and pj2 = 28 with total revenue 44;
• Optimal sharp envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j2}, Xi2 = {j1, j3} and pj1 = pj3 = 8
and pj2 = 28 with total revenue 44;
• Optimal consecutive envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j3}, Xi2 = {j1, j2} and pj1 = pj3 =
6 and pj2 = 26 with total revenue 38;
• Optimal (relaxed) bundle envy-free solution, Xi1 = {j2}, Xi2 = {j1, j3} and pj1 =
pj3 = 8 and pj2 = 30 with total revenue 46;
The other concept we will consider is competitive equilibrium, which requires that,
besides envy-freeness, every unsold item must be priced at zero (or at any given reserve
price). Such market clearance condition captures efficiency of the whole market.
Definition 2.2.5 (Competitive Equilibrium). We say a market mechanism (X,p) is a
relaxed/sharp/consecutive competitive equilibrium if it satisfies two conditions.
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• (X,p) must be a relaxed/sharp/consecutive envy-free pricing.
• the unsold items must be priced at zero.
For brevity, we can call a solution envy-free instead of relaxed/sharp/consecutive
envy-free, if there is no confusion in the following sections. For a given output (X,p), the
revenue collected by the market maker is defined as
∑m
j=1 pj (equivalently,
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈Xi pj).
We are interested in revenue maximizing solutions, specifically, revenue maximizing com-
petitive equilibrium.
It is well known that a competitive equilibrium always exists for unit demand buyers
(even for general vij valuations) [55]; for our sharp/consecutive multi-unit demand mod-
el, however, a competitive equilibrium may not exist, as the following example shows
(however, the relaxed competitive equilibrium always exists)
Example 2.2.2 (Sharp/consecutive competitive equilibrium need not exist). There are
two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 10 and vi2 = 9, and demands di1 = 1 and di2 = 2,
respectively, and two items j1, j2 with unit quality qj1 = qj2 = 1. If i1 wins an item,
without loss of generality, say j1, then j2 is unsold and pj2 = 0; by envy-freeness of
i1, we have pj1 = 0. Thus, i2 envies the bundle {j1, j2}. If i2 wins both items, then
pj1 + pj2 ≤ vi2j1 + vi2j2 = 18, implying that pj1 ≤ 9 or pj2 ≤ 9; thus, i1 is not envy-free.
Hence, there is no competitive equilibrium in the given instance.
In the unit demand case, it is well-known that the set of equilibrium prices forms
a distributive lattice; hence, there exist extremes which correspond to the maximum
and the minimum equilibrium price vectors. In our sharp/consecutive demand model,
however, even if a competitive equilibrium exists, maximum equilibrium prices may not
exist (however, the maximum relaxed competitive equilibrium always exists).
Example 2.2.3 (Maximum equilibrium need not exist for sharp/consecutive buyers).
There are two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 10, vi2 = 1 and demands di1 = 2, di2 = 1,
and two items j1, j2 with unit quality qj1 = qj2 = 1. It can be seen that allocating the
two items to i1 at prices (19, 1) or (1, 19) are both revenue maximizing equilibria; but
there is no equilibrium price vector which is at least both (19, 1) and (1, 19).
In the context of the sharp/consecutive multi-unit demand, an interesting and impor-
tant property is that it is possible that some items are ‘over-priced’; this is a significant
difference between sharp/consecutive multi-unit and unit demand models. Formally, in
a solution (X,p), we say an item j is over-priced if there is a buyer i such that j ∈ Xi
and pj > viqj . That is, the price charged for item j is larger than its contribution to the
utility of its winner.
Example 2.2.4 (Over-priced items in sharp/consecutive envy-freeness). There are two
buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 20, vi2 = 10 and demands di1 = 1 and di2 = 2, and three
items j1, j2, j3 with qualities qj1 = 3, qj2 = 2, qj3 = 1. We can see that the allocations
Xi1 = {j1}, Xi2 = {j2, j3} and prices (45, 25, 5) constitute a revenue maximizing envy-
free solution with total revenue 75, where item j2 is over-priced. If no items are over-
priced, the maximum possible prices are (40, 20, 10) with total revenue 70.
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In all, the relaxed envy-free solution and relaxed competitive equilibrium share the
similar property as unit demand model (One can replace each multi-unit demand bidder
by multiple unit-demand bidders, and the problem is then reduced to the unit-demand
case) while the sharp/consecutive model exhibits different structure property, which is
important in banner advertisement. While relaxed demand or sharp demand model
serves as general banner advertisements, the consecutive demand model fits properly
advertisement of rich media ads and TV ads, where the media (pic,video, flash) may
require a fix number of consecutive number of slots. Thus, when we refer to consecutive
buyers, we mean rich media advertisement buyers.
Chapter 3
Multi-unit Bayesian Auction with
Demand or Budget Constraints
In this chapter, we will study revenue maximization problem under Bayesian settings
for various demand or budget constraints. Our main theorem for this chapter is the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For the relaxed demand, the sharp demand and consecutive demand
(when qualities have constant peak) case without budget constraints, an optimal mecha-
nism can be constructed efficiently. The problem for the consecutive demand model with
arbitrary peak is shown to be NP-hard; for the case with the budget constraint but without
demand constraint, a 2-approximate mechanism can be constructed efficiently.
The road map of this chapter are as follows. In Section 3.1, elementary settings are
introduced. We will review the classical characterization of Bayesian Incentive Com-
patibility in Section 3.2 and show how the payments can be discarded in the objective
by incorporating Myerson’s virtual value functions. We will solve the pure optimization
problems for relaxed demand and sharp demand in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 respec-
tively. Section 3.5 and 3.6 contribute for consecutive demand buyers. At the end, in
Section 3.7, a 2-approximate mechanism is proposed for budget constrained buyers.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Demand Constraints
In our auction design problem, recall we want to sell m items to n buyers. Each buyer
has a private number vi representing her valuation and each item is characterized by a
number qj which can be viewed as the quality or desirability of the item. Thus, the ith
buyer’s value for item j is viqj . In other words, the valuation matrix for n buyers and m
items is the outer product of v and q. Buyers are also assumed to abide by additional
constraints as follows. We consider four specific constraints of this problem.
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1 Relaxed Demand Constraint: Buyer i’s demand is relaxedly constrained by di if i
may buy any number of items up to a maximum di in this auction.
2 Sharp Demand Constraint: Buyer i’s demand is sharply constrained by di if i must
buy exactly di items in this auction or alternatively buys nothing.
3 Consecutive Demand Constraint: Buyer i’s demand is consecutively constrained
by di (w.r.t. a given total order on the items) if i must buy exactly di consecutive
items in this auction or alternatively buys nothing.
4 Budget Constraint: Buyer i’s budget is constrained by a publicly known number
Bi if i cannot pay more than Bi.
3.1.2 Goal and Objectives
Given the buyers’ value distributions, our goal is to design BIC and ex-interim IR mech-
anisms to allocate items to buyers so as to maximize the auctioneer’s expected revenue.
As is common in Computer Science, the optimal solution may be hard to compute
efficiently, so we also consider the mechanisms which implement this objective approxi-
mately. More precisely, our aim is to devise a mechanism that for any distributions of
buyers’ values, the mechanism guarantees at least 1/α times the optimum, where α is a
constant. We call such mechanisms α-approximate mechanisms.
Definition 3.2 (α-approximate Mechanism). We say a BIC and ex-interim IR mecha-
nism M is an α-approximate mechanism if and only if for any BIC and ex-interim IR
mechanism M ′, Rev(M) ≥ 1/α · Rev(M ′). We say a mechanism is optimal if it is a
1-approximate mechanism.
We are also interested in obtaining computationally efficient mechanisms, which is
made precise by requiring that they should be computable in polynomial time. That is
of course a standard requirement in the context of algorithmic mechanism design.
3.2 Characterization of Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we show that, in these auction domains, the optimal randomized, BIC
and ex-interim IR auction can be represented by a simple deterministic, IC and ex-post
IR auction. Furthermore, this optimal auction can be constructed efficiently.
Our constructions and proofs are simple and based on a basic idea of converting
the optimization problem with allocation rules and payment rules to a problem only
involving allocations. This can be done in two steps. First, due to the fact that our
mechanism design problems fall within the single parameter domain where each player
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can be represented by a single parameter (i.e., his value per unit of quality), we can
replace the complicated BIC conditions with a much simpler requirement of monotonicity
on allocation rules. After that, all of the constraints are related with allocation functions
instead of payments. Second, although the objective of our auction is to maximize the
revenue, we can show that to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue in a BIC auction is
equivalent to maximizing a specific function of allocations, more precisely, the virtual
surplus which is developed in [51]. Thus, we can get rid of the payments in our optimizing
goal as well.
After this transformation, the original revenue optimization problems can be viewed
as simple combinatorial optimization problems. As we will show later, our problems can
be solved efficiently and even in a deterministic way.
3.2.1 Monotonicity
Although the Incentive Compatibility is defined in the terms of payments, it can be
boiled down to a simple condition of monotonicity in single parameter settings. The
proof can be sketched as follows. Fix a player i and all other players’ bids v−i. Recall
that we use ti, a function of v to denote the total quality of items assigned to i. Consider
two possible values vi and v
′
i player i may hold. By the definition of IC, we have
viti(vi; v−i)−pi(vi; v−i) ≥ viti(v′i; v−i)−pi(v′i; v−i) and similarly v′iti(v′i; v−i)−pi(v′i; v−i) ≥
v′iti(vi; v−i)−pi(vi; v−i). Summing up these two inequalities, we got (vi−v′i)(ti(vi; v−i)−
ti(v
′
i; v−i)) ≥ 0. It follows that, ti(x; v−i) must be a monotone non-decreasing function of
x for any given v−i. Regarding the Bayesian setting, the BIC condition can be similarly
characterized in the following Lemma 3.3 adapted from [51]. For convenience in the
Bayesian model, let Ti(vi) be the expectation of ti(v) over all other players’ bids, more
precisely, Ti(vi) = Ev−i [ti(v)]. Similarly, we define an expected version of payment rules,
thus Pi(vi) = Ev−i [pi(v)].
Lemma 3.3 (From [51]). A mechanism M = (x, p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible if
and only if:
a) Ti(x) is monotone non-decreasing for any buyer i.
b) Pi(vi) = viTi(vi)−
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz
Proof. If M = (x, p) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible, then for any vi and v
′
i,
viTi(vi)− Pi(vi) ≥ viTi(v′i)− Pi(v′i)
v′iTi(v
′
i)− Pi(v′i) ≥ v′iTi(vi)− Pi(vi)
Plus above two inequality, we could get (vi − v′i)(Ti(vi) − Ti(v′i)) ≥ 0, hence, Ti(x) is
monotone non-decreasing for any buyer i. in addition, let Ui(vi, T, P ) = viTi(vi)−Pi(vi),
viTi(vi) − Pi(vi) ≥ viTi(v′i) − Pi(v′i) is equivalent to Ui(vi, T, P ) ≥ (vi − v′i)Ti(v′i) +
Ui(v
′
i, T, P ), for any i, vi, v
′
i. Therefore, Ui(vi, T, P ) = Ui(vi, T, P ) +
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz. Since,
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w.l.o.g. Ui(vi, T, P ) = 0, thus,
Pi(vi) = viTi(vi)−
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz.
Similarly, if a) and b) hold, then viTi(vi)−Pi(vi) ≥ viTi(v′i)−Pi(v′i) is equivalent to (by
b))
∫ vi
v′i
Ti(z)dz ≥ (vi − v′i)Ti(v′i), which is true by monotonicity of Ti(x).
3.2.2 Virtual Surplus
For single item settings where the auctioneer has only one item to be sold, [51] showed
that to maximize the seller’s revenue is equivalent to maximizing the social welfare when
each buyer’s bid is his virtual value defined as φi(vi) = vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , where recall that
Fi(x) and fi(x) are respectively the Cumulative Distribution Function and Probability
Density Function of the buyer i’s value distribution. That is, the virtual value of an
buyer is her true value minus the Hazard Rate of her value and distribution. Then given
buyers’ distributions, we define the virtual surplus as the expectation of the summation
of every buyer’s virtual value times her allocation, more precisely, Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)].
Then we can show that in both of our auction domains in this section, expected revenue
is equal to expected virtual surplus.
Lemma 3.4 (From [51]). For any BIC mechanism M = (x, p), the expected revenue
Ev[
∑
i Pi(vi)] is equal to the virtual surplus Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)].
Proof.
Ev[Pi(vi)] = Ev[−Ui(vi, T, P ) + viTi(vi)]
= Ev[−Ui(vi, T, P )] + Ev[viTi(vi)]
= −Ev[
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz] + Ev[viti(v)]
= −
∫ vi
vi
dvi
∫ vi
vi
fi(vi)Ti(z)dz + Ev[viti(v)]
= −
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)dz
∫ vi
z
fi(vi)dvi + Ev[viti(v)]
= −
∫ vi
vi
Ti(z)(1− Fi(z))dz + Ev[viti(v)]
= −
∫ vi
vi
Ti(vi)
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
fi(vi)dz + Ev[viti(v)]
= −Ev[Ti(vi)1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
] + Ev[viti(v)]
= Ev[φi(vi)ti(v)]
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We assume φi(t) is monotone increasing, i.e. the distribution is regular. Otherwise,
Myerson’s ironing technique can be utilized to make φi(t) monotone — it is here that we
invoke our assumption that we can efficiently compute the convex closure of a continuous
function and integration. More precisely, let φ¯i(t) be the ironing virtual value of buyer i
(we refer to [51] for concrete definitions), where φ¯i(t) is regular. Myerson’s classic results
give the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.5 (From [51]). Let x be an allocation that maximizes the ironing virtual
surplus Ev[
∑
i φ¯i(vi)ti(v)], satisfying (1) monotone property (e.g. Ti(vi) is monotone
non-decreasing for any buyer i) and supply and demand constraints (2) if φ¯i(vi) =
φ¯i(v
′
i) then Ti(vi) = Ti(v
′
i), ∀vi 6= v′i, and p be the payment such that pi(v) = viti(v) −∫ vi
vi
ti(v−i, si)dsi ∀i, then (x, p) is an optimal BIC mechanism.
Since the allocation in the following sections is computed by deterministic algorithms,
the property (2) in Lemma 3.5 is satisfied naturally. Hence, by Lemma 3.5, w.l.o.g., we
always suppose virtual value φi(t) is regular (e.g. monotone increasing).
By Lemma 3.3 and 3.4, in order to maximize the expected revenue, one needs only to
design algorithms to find the allocation to maximize the virtual surplus
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)
for each given v and simultaneously make the algorithm satisfy monotonicity (e.g. part
(a) in Lemma 3.3). Fortunately, we will prove in the following powerful lemma that any
deterministic algorithm maximizing the virtual surplus must be monotone. Hence, our
main task will be seeking deterministic algorithm to maximize virtual surplus in various
settings.
Lemma 3.6. Any deterministic algorithm that achieves the maximum virtual surplus∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) for any given v, must be monotone, that is, Ti(vi) is monotone non-
decreasing for any buyer i.
Proof. We will prove a stronger fact, that ti(vi, v−i) is non-decreasing as vi increas-
es. Given other buyers’ bids v−i, the monotonicity of ti is equivalent to ti(vi, v−i) ≤
ti(v
′
i, v−i) if v
′
i > vi. Assuming that v
′
i > vi, the regularity of φi implies that φi(vi) ≤
φi(v
′
i). If φi(vi) = φi(v
′
i), then ti(vi, v−i) = ti(v
′
i, v−i) and we are done.
Consider the case that φi(vi) < φi(v
′
i). Let Q and Q
′ denote the total quantities
obtained by all the other buyers except buyer i in the mechanism when buyer i bids vi
and v′i respectively.
φi(v
′
i)ti(v
′
i, v−i) +Q
′ ≥ φi(v′i)ti(vi, v−i) +Q
φi(vi)ti(vi, v−i) +Q ≥ φi(vi)ti(v′i, v−i) +Q′.
Above inequalities are due to the optimality of allocations when i bids vi and v
′
i respec-
tively. It follows that
φi(v
′
i)(ti(vi, v−i)− ti(v′i, v−i)) ≤ Q′ −Q
φi(vi)(ti(vi, v−i)− ti(v′i, v−i)) ≥ Q′ −Q
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By the fact that φi(vi) < φi(v
′
i), it must be ti(vi, v−i) ≤ ti(v′i, v−i).
3.3 Relaxed Demand Case
Recall that a mechanism M = (x, p) satisfies the relaxed demand constraint di for buyer
i if for any realization of the mechanism, any buyer i cannot be assigned more than di
items. Note that our mechanism only considers the allocation probability x, not the
realized allocations. To convert the randomized mechanism to a realized allocation, we
need a randomized rounding procedure satisfying the demand constraints. Fortunately,
such a procedure is explicit in the the Birkhoff-Von Neumann theorem [42]. Thus, the
relaxed demand constraint can be rewritten as
∑
j(xij) ≤ di for each buyer i. By
using the characterization of BIC and virtual surplus, we can transform the revenue
optimization problem to an essentially simpler combinatorial optimization problem. The
following lemma follows from Lemma 3.3 and 3.4.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that x is the allocation function that maximizes Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)]
subject to the constraints that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing and inequalities∑
j
xij(v) ≤ di,
∑
i
xij(v) ≤ 1, xij(v) ≥ 0. (3.1)
Suppose also that
pi(v) = viti(v)−
∫ vi
vi
ti(v−i, si)dsi (3.2)
Then (x, p) represents an optimal mechanism for the relaxed demand case.
A main observation on Lemma 3.7 is that all inequalities in Eq. (3.1) only constrain
v independently, not correlatively with different vs. This allows us to consider the
optimization problem for each v separately. After that, we will prove Ti is still monotone
increasing in the resulting mechanism. In other words, we consider the problem of
maximizing
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) for each v separately instead of maximizing its expectation
overall. This problem can be solved by a simple greedy algorithm in the spirit of assigning
items with good quality to buyers with higher virtual value. For completeness, we
describe our mechanism for the relaxed demand case in Algorithm 1.
Ultimately, we prove that the Ti deduced from our mechanism is monotone non-
decreasing in the following theorem — our summary statement.
Theorem 3.8. The mechanism that applies the allocation rule according to Algorithm 1
and payment rule according to Equation (3.2) is an optimal mechanism for the multi
unit auction design problem with relaxed demand constrained buyers.
Proof. It suffices to prove that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing, which directly comes
from Lemma 3.6.
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Algorithm 1: Relaxed
Input: Demands di, CDFs Fi, PDFs fi, qualities qj and bids v
Output: Allocation xij
1 φi ← vi − 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) ;
2 Sort buyers in decreasing order of φi;
3 Sort items in decreasing order of qj ;
4 xij ← 0;
5 for each buyer i do
6 for each item j do
7 if φi > 0 and
∑
i xij < 1 and
∑
j xij < di then
8 xij ← 1;
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 return x;
3.4 Sharp Demand Case
We now describe how to design an optimal mechanism for sharp demand cases. Recall
that if a buyer is sharply constrained by di, he only wants to buy exactly di items
or nothing. Thus the only difference between this problem with the one with relaxed
constraints is that the inequalities (3.1) in Lemma 3.7 should be replaced by the following
inequalities1. ∑
j
xij(v) = di or 0,
∑
i
xij(v) ≤ 1, xij(v) ≥ 0 ∀i, j,v (3.3)
By Lemma 3.3 and 3.4, similar to the relaxed demand case, we can convert the revenue
optimization problem in the sharp demand case to a simple combinatorial optimization
problem.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that x is the allocation function maximizing Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)]
subject to the constraints that Ti(vi) is non-decreasing monotone and inequalities (3.3).
Suppose also that
pi(v) = viti(v)−
∫ vi
vi
ti(si, v−i)dsi.
Then (x, p) represents an optimal mechanism for the sharp demand case.
Considering each bidding profile v−i separately, we observe that the optimal mech-
anism always maximizes
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) for all v subject to sharp demand constraints.
By incorporating the definition of ti, our goal is to maximize
∑
i
∑
j φi(vi)qjxij(v) sub-
ject to
∑
j xij(v) = di or 0 and
∑
i xij(v) ≤ 1. It is not hard to see this problem is
1The formula
∑
j xij(v) = di or 0 here is not precise since in the random mechanism
∑
j xij(v) may
be arbitrary number between 0 and di. More precise definition may be complex e.g. distribution over
deterministic mechanism. However, we didn’t explicitly use the randomized value of
∑
j xij(v) in our
algorithm, and our mechanism is deterministic implying xij ∈ {0, 1}, and,∑j xij(v) = di or 0 is correct
if xij ∈ {0, 1}, hence we still use this formula here.
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equivalent to a maximum weighted matching problem on a bipartite graph with n left
nodes and m right nodes. For any pair of nodes (i, j) ∈ [n] × [m], there exists an edge
with weight φi(vi)qj . Besides, the matching should satisfy an additional constraint that
each left node must be matched with exact di right nodes or nothing. We call this
problem maximum weighted matching with sharp constraints. An essential observation
our algorithm relies on is a property of the optimal solution as we will show in Lemma
3.10. For convenience, we sort all left nodes in decreasing order of their φi(vi) and all
right nodes in decreasing order of their qj .
Lemma 3.10. There must exist an optimal solution for the maximum weighted matching
problem with sharp constraints such that each left node is matched with consecutive di
right nodes or nothing.
Proof. Assume by contradiction, there exists a left node that the optimal match it with
a set of non-consecutive right nodes. Let i be the first left node (w.r.t. the decreasing
order of φi(vi)) with this property and Ui be the set of right nodes assigned to i. By
our assumption, Ui is not consecutive. Thus, there exists a right node j not in Ui such
that mink∈Ui{qk} ≤ qj ≤ maxk∈Ui{qk}. It is easy to see that j must be assigned to a
left node with smaller φ than i otherwise i is not the first left node with non-consecutive
matching set. Let r be the last node of Ui, i.e. with the largest index in Ui. Thus
qj ≥ qr. After that, we can refine the optimal solution by exchanging the assignment
of node j and node r. The resulting assignment is still feasible and has larger weight.
Keep doing this, we can get the desired optimal solution.
By using this property, the problem can be solved by dynamic programming precisely.
Let w[i, j] denote the weight of the maximum weighted matchings with first i left nodes
and all the first j right nodes being assigned. Initially, w[0, 0] = 0 and w[0, j] = −∞,
∀j 6= 0. Then we have the transition function,
w[i, j] = max
{
w[i− 1, j], w[i− 1, j − di] +
j∑
k=j−di+1
φi(vi)ck
}
Finding the maximum w[i, j] over i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] gives the maximum weighted
matchings and optimal solutions.
Theorem 3.11. The mechanism which applies the allocation rule w.r.t. the above Dy-
namic Programming and payment rule w.r.t equation (3.2) is an optimal mechanism for
multi unit auction design problem with sharp demand constrained buyers.
Proof. To complete the proof of Theorem 3.11, it is sufficient to show Ti(vi) is non-
decreasing, which follows directly from Lemma 3.6.
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3.5 Optimal Auction of Consecutive Demand for the Sin-
gle Peak Case
The goal of this section is to present our optimal auction for the single peak case that
serves as an elementary component in general case later. En route, several principal
techniques are examined exhaustively to the extent that they can be applied directly
in next section. By employing these techniques, we show that the optimal Bayesian
Incentive Compatible auction can be represented by a simple Incentive Compatible one.
Furthermore, this optimal auction can be implemented efficiently.
As mentioned above, we attempt to attain the BIC auction that maximizes the auc-
tioneer’s expected revenue. The same as above, we will transform the problem of BIC
revenue maximization problem to a optimization problem only involved with alloca-
tion in objective function and where BIC is replaced by monotonicity of total expected
qualities. After this transformation, the original revenue optimization problems can be
viewed as simple combinatorial optimization problems. Fortunately, we observe delicate
structures in the optimal solution that allow us to solve the problem entirely.
As pointed out in Section 3.1 and 3.2, a banner (maybe rich media) advertisemen-
t auction meets a buyer i’s demand denoted by a number di if for any realization of
the auction, the buyer i must be assigned either di consecutive slots or nothing. By
incorporating the characterization of BIC and virtual surplus, we can transform the rev-
enue optimization problem to an essentially simpler combinatorial optimization problem.
The following lemma that follows from Lemma 3.3 and 3.4, formalizes the optimization
problem.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose that x is the allocation function that maximizes Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)]
subject to the constraints that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing and for any bidders’
profile v, any buyer i is assigned either di consecutive slots or nothing. Suppose also
that
pi(v) = viti(v)−
∫ vi
vi
ti(v−i, si)dsi (3.4)
Then (x, p) represents an optimal mechanism for the rich media advertisement problem
in single-peak case.
A main observation on Lemma 3.12 is that except the monotonicity all requirements
on the mechanism only constrain v independently, not correlatively with different vs.
This allows us to consider the optimization problem for each v separately. In other words,
we consider the problem of maximizing
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) for each v separately instead
of maximizing its expectation overall. After that, we will prove Ti is still monotone
increasing in the resulting mechanism.
Given above discussions, a very important component of the optimal banner adver-
tisement auction is to assign ad slots to advertisers consecutively and simultaneously to
maximize the summation of virtual values, i.e. φi(vi)ti(v). When exerting ourselves on
this specific problem, we make several preliminary observations that allow us to derive
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a dynamic programming for the single-peak case. Without loss of generality, we assume
all buyers are sorted in the decreasing order of their virtual values. First, we show that
the optimal assignment must be consecutive, i.e. there is no unassigned slots between
any bidders’ allocated slots (see Figure 3.1).
Lemma 3.13. There exists an optimal allocation x that maximizes
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) in
single peak case, satisfies the following condition. For any unassigned slot j, it must be
either ∀j′ > j, slot j′ is unassigned or ∀j′ < j, slot j′ is unassigned.
Proof. We pick an arbitrary optimal allocation x that maximizes the summation of
virtual values. If x satisfies the property, it is the desired allocation and we are done.
Otherwise, we do the following modification on x. Let slot j (1 < j < m) be the
unassigned slot between buyers’ allocated slots. Since the quality function are single
peaked, we have qj ≥ qj+1 or qj ≥ qj−1. We only prove the lemma for the case qj ≥ qj+1
and the proof for the other case is symmetric. Let slot j′ > j be the leftmost assigned
slot on the right side of j. We modify x by assigning the buyer i who got the slot j′ the
di consecutive slots from j. It is easy to check the resulting allocation is still feasible
and optimal. Moreover, the slot j becomes assigned now. By keep doing this, we can
eliminate all unassigned slots between buyers’ allocations. Thus, the resulting allocation
must be consecutive.
Unassigned
Slot j Slot j'
Buyer i
Buyer i Unassigned
Slot j Slot j'
Figure 3.1: By re-assigning i the slots from j, we make the set of assigned slots
consecutive.
Next, we prove that this consecutiveness even holds for all set [s] ⊆ [n]. That is,
there exists an optimal allocation that always assigns the first s buyers consecutively
for all s ∈ [n]. For convenience, we call a slot is out of a set of buyers if the slot is not
assigned to any buyers in that set. Then the consecutiveness can be formalized in the
following lemma.
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Lemma 3.14. There exists an optimal allocation x in single peak case, satisfies the
following condition. For any slot j out of [s], it must be either ∀j′ > j, slot j′ is out of
[s] or ∀j′ < j, slot j′ is out of [s].
Proof. The idea is to pick an arbitrary optimal allocation x and modify it to the desired
one. Suppose x does not satisfy the property on a subset [s]. By Lemma 3.13, there is
no unassigned slots in the middle of allocations to set [s]. Then there must be a slot
assigned to a buyer i out of the set [s] that separates the allocations to [s] We use Wi
to denote the allocated slots of buyer i. Suppose slot k is the peak. There are two cases
to be considered:
Case 1. k /∈Wi.
Let j and j′ be the leftmost and rightmost slot in Wi respectively. We consider
two cases qj ≥ qj′ and qj < qj′ . We only prove for the first case and the proof for
the other case is symmetric. If qj ≥ qj′ , we find the leftmost slot j1 > j′ assigned
to [s] and the rightmost slot j2 < j1 not assigned to [s]. In addition, let i1 ∈ [s]
be the buyer that j1 is assigned to and i2 > s be the buyer that j2 is assigned to.
In single peak case, it is easy to check qj ≥ qj′ implies that all the slots assigned
to i2 have higher quality than i1’s. Thus swapping the positions of i1 and i2, as
illustrated in Figure 3.2, will always increase the virtual surplus,
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v).
By keep doing this, we can eliminate all slots out of [s] in the middle of allocation
to [s] and attain the desired optimal solution.
Case 2. k ∈Wi
Suppose Wi = {ji1, ji2, · · · , jiui} with ji1 < ji2 < · · · < jiui and there exists 1 ≤ e ≤ ui
such that k = jie. Let a and b be the left and right neighbour buyers of i winning
slots next to Wi. As we know a, b ∈ [s], hence, φa(va) ≥ φi(vi) and φb(vb) ≥ φi(vi).
Let Wa = {ja1 , ja2 , · · · , jaua} and Wb = {jb1, jb2, · · · , jbui} denote the allocated slots of
buyer a and b respectively, where ja1 < j
a
2 < · · · < jaua and jb1 < jb2 < · · · < jbub .
As k ∈ Wi, then qji1 ≥ qjaua and qjiui ≥ qjb1 (noting that j
a
ua and j
b
1 are the indices
of slots with the largest qualities in Wa and Wb respectively). We will show that
either swapping winning slots of i with a or with b will increase the virtual surplus.
To prove this, there four cases needed to be considered: (1). ui ≥ ua and ui ≥ ub;
(2). ui ≥ ua and ui < ub; (3). ui < ua and ui ≥ ub; (4). ui < ua and ui < ub. We
only prove the case (1) since the other cases can be proved similarly. Now, suppose
ui ≥ ua and ui ≥ ub, then we must have either (i).
∑ub
k=1 qjik
≥ ∑ubk=1 qjbk or (ii).∑ua
k=1 qjiui−k+1
≥ ∑uak=1 qjak . Suppose (i) is not true, that is ∑ubk=1 qjik < ∑ubk=1 qjbk ,
if ub ≤ e, then we have qji1 ≤ qjiub , as a result,
ubqji1
≤
ub∑
k=1
qjik
<
ub∑
k=1
qjbk
≤ ubqjb1 ≤ ubqjiui ,
thus, qji1
< qjiui
; otherwise ub > e, then it must also hold that qji1
≤ qjiub (otherwise,
for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ ub, qji` ≥ qjiub ≥ qjb1 implying that
∑ub
k=1 qjik
≥ ubqjb1 ≥
∑ub
k=1 qjbk
,
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contradiction), hence, for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ ub, qji` ≥ qji1 , it follows,
ubqji1
≤
ub∑
k=1
qjik
<
ub∑
k=1
qjbk
≤ ubqjb1 ≤ ubqjiui ,
in both cases, it is obtained that qji1
< qjiui
, therefore,
ua∑
k=1
qjiui−k+1
> uaqji1
≥
ua∑
k=1
qjak
implying (ii) is true. Thus, if (i) is true, by simple calculations, swapping winning
slots of i with b will increase the virtual value (since φb(vb) ≥ φi(vi)), otherwise
swapping winning slots of i with a will increase the virtual surplus (since φa(va) ≥
φi(vi)). Then keep doing it by the method of Case 1 until eliminating all slots out
of [s] in the middle of allocation to [s] and attaining the desired optimal solution.
Buyer i Buyer i2
Slot j Slot j' Slot j2 Slot j1
Buyer i1
Buyer i Buyer i1 Buyer i2
Slot j Slot j' Slot j2 Slot j1
Figure 3.2: Slots with light color are assigned to [s]. By swapping the positions of i1
and i2, we make the allocations to [s] consecutive.
Lemma 3.14 reveals the optimal substructure that allows us to solve the problem by
dynamic programming. Since the optimal solution always assigns to [s] consecutively, we
can boil the allocations to [s] down to an interval denoted by [l, r]. Let g[s, l, r] denote
the maximized value of our objective function
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) when we only consider
first s buyers and the allocation of s is exactly the interval [l, r]. Initially, we have
g[0, l, l − 1] = 0, 1 ≤ l ≤ m + 1 and g[0, l, r] = −∞, otherwise. Then we have the
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following transition function.
g[s, l, r] = max

g[s− 1, l, r]
g[s− 1, l, r − ds] + φs(vs)
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, l + ds, r] + φs(vs)
∑l+ds−1
j=l qj
(3.5)
The optimality of the allocation obtained from the Dynamic Programming just fol-
lows from Lemma 3.14. More precisely, the optimal solution always assign the sth buyer
nothing or slots next to (on the left or right) the interval allocated to first s− 1 buyers.
Ultimately, by Lemma 3.12, we prove that the Ti deduced from our mechanism is
monotone non-decreasing in the following theorem — our summary statement.
Theorem 3.15. The mechanism that applies the allocation rule according to Dynamic
Programming (3.5) and payment rule according to Equation (3.4) is an optimal mecha-
nism for the banner advertisement problem with single peak qualities.
Proof. The proof comes straightforwardly from Lemma 3.6.
3.6 The General Case of Consecutive Demand Buyers
We now move to the general case where the qualities of item may have several peaks.
We assume the number of peaks h is constant. This is a reasonable assumption when
we consider the rich media advertisement and TV advertisement. For arbitrary peak,
NP-hardness will be shown. It should be emphasized again that we study the revenue
maximization problem in the Bayesian setting and our goal is to find out the optimal
auction (with maximum revenue) among all Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction.
As we have shown in Section 3.5, the Bayesian Incentive Compatibility can be re-
placed with a simple requirement for monotonicity of allocation functions. Moreover,
as Myerson showed in [51], to maximize the revenue in Bayesian setting is equivalent to
maximizing the virtual surplus. Similar with Lemma 3.12, Lemma 3.16 following from
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 show the essential part of our optimal auction construction.
Lemma 3.16. Suppose that x is the allocation function that maximizes Ev[
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v)]
subject to the constraints that Ti(vi) is monotone non-decreasing and for any bidders’
profile v, any buyer i is assigned either di consecutive slots or nothing. Suppose also
that
pi(v) = viti(v)−
∫ vi
vi
ti(v−i, si)dsi (3.6)
Then (x, p) represents an optimal mechanism for the banner advertisement problem in
general case.
Consider the problem of maximizing
∑
i φi(vi)ti(v) for each v. Recall that there are
only h peaks (local maximum) in the qualities. Thus, there are at most h − 1 valleys
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(local minimum). Since h is a constant, we can enumerate all the buyers occupying the
valleys. After this enumeration, we can divide the qualities into at most h consecutive
pieces and each of them forms a single-peak. Then using similar properties as those in
Lemma 3.13 and 3.14, we can obtain a larger size dynamic programming (still runs in
polynomial time) similar to dynamic programming (3.5) to solve the problem.
Theorem 3.17. There is a polynomial algorithm to compute revenue maximization
problem in Bayesian settings where the qualities of slots have constant number of peaks.
Proof. Our proof is based on the single peak algorithm. Assume there are h peaks,
then there must be h− 1 valleys. Suppose these valleys are indexed j1, j2, · · · , jh−1. In
optimal allocation, for any jk, k = 1, 2, · · · , h − 1, jk must be allocated to a buyer or
unassigned to any buyer. If jk is assigned to a buyer, say, buyer i, since i would buy di
consecutive slots, jk may appear in `th position of this di consecutive slots. Hence, by
this brute force, each jk will at most have
∑
i di + 1 ≤ mn + 1 possible positions to be
allocated. In all, all the valleys have (mn + 1)h possible allocated positions. For each
of this allocation, the slots is broken into h single peak slots. We can obtain similar
properties as those in Lemma 3.13 and 3.14. Without loss of generality, suppose the
rest buyers are still the set [n], with non-increasing virtual value. Since the optimal
solution always assigns to [s] concentrating in h intervals, we can boil the allocations to
[s] down to intervals denoted by [li, ri], i = 1, 2, · · · , h, where [li, ri] lies in the i-th single
peak slot. Let g[s, l1, r1, · · · , lh, rh] denote the maximized value of our objective function∑
i φi(vi)ti(~v) when we only consider first s buyers and the allocations of [s] are exactly
intervals [li, ri], i = 1, 2, · · · , h. Then we have the following transition function.
g[s, l1, r1, · · · , lh, rh] = max
i∈[d]

g[s− 1, l1, r1, · · · , lh, rh]
g[s− 1, l1, r1, · · · , li, ri − ds, · · · , lh, rh] + φs(vs)
∑ri
j=ri−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, l1, r1, · · · , li + ds, ri, · · · , lh, rh] + φs(vs)
∑li+ds−1
j=li
qj
Theorem 3.18. If the qualities of slots have arbitrary peaks, the revenue maximization
problem of Bayesian settings is NP-hard
Proof. We prove the NP-hardness by reducing the 3 partition problem that is to decide
whether a given multi-set of integers can be partitioned into certain number of subsets
that all have the same sum. More precisely, given a multi-set S of 3n positive integers,
can S be partitioned into n subsets S1, . . . , Sn such that the sum of the numbers in
each subset is equal? The 3 partition problem has been proven to be NP-complete in a
strong sense in [36], meaning that it remains NP-complete even when the integers in S
are bounded above by a polynomial in n.
Given a instance of 3 partition (a1, a2, . . . , a3n), we construct a instance for advertis-
ing problem with 3n advertisers and m = n+
∑
i ai slots. It should be mentioned that
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m is polynomial of n due to the fact that all ai are bouned by a polynomial of n. In
the advertising instance, the valuation vi for each advertiser i is 1 and his demand di is
defined as ai. Moreover, for any advertiser, his valuation distribution is that vi = 1 with
probability 1. Then everyone’s virtual value is exactly 1. By Lemma 3.16, to maximize
revenue is equivalent to maximize the simplified function
∑
i
∑
j xijqj .
Let B =
∑
i ai/n. We define the quality of slot j is 0 if j is times of B+ 1, otherwise
qj = 1. That can be illustrated as follows.
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0 . . . 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
0
It is not hard to see that the optimal revenue is
∑
i ai iff there is a solution to this
3 partition instance.
3.7 Approximate Mechanism for Budget Constraints
In this section, we will present a 2-approximate mechanism for the Multi-item auction
with budget constrained buyers. It should be noted that there is no demand constraints
for all the buyers considered in this section. Recall that a mechanism M = (x, p) satisfies
the buyer i’s budget constraint iff pi(v) ≤ Bi for all buyer profiles v. If m = 1, i.e. the
auctioneer only has one slot, a 2- approximate mechanism has been suggested in [1] and
[6]. Thus, our approach is to reduce the Multi-item Auction to Single-item Auction,
i.e. the case for m = 1. Recall that Bi denotes bidder i’s budget, xij(v) denote the
probability of allocating item j to buyer i when the buyers’ bids revealed type is v and
recall we use ti(v) =
∑
j qjxij(v), a function of v to denote the total quality of items
assigned to i. Then the multi-item auction problem can be formalized as the following
optimization problem.
Max: Ev
[∑
i
pi(v)
]
s.t. Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)] ≥ Ev−i [viti(v′i, v−i)− pi(v′i, v−i)], ∀v, i, v′i
Ev−i [viti(v)− pi(v)] ≥ 0, ∀v, i
pi(v) ≤ Bi, ∀v, i
xij(v) ≥ 0 ∀v, i, j∑
i
xij(v) ≤ 1 ∀v, j
(Multi-item)
Now consider the following single-item problem. Denote B′i =
Bi∑
j qj
, and let yi(v) be
the allocation function for bidder i and si(v) be the payment function for bidder i. The
single-item auction with budget constraints can be formalized as following optimization
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problem.
Max: Ev
[∑
i
si(v)
]
s.t. Ev−i [viyi(v)− si(v)] ≥ Ev−i
[
viyi(v
′
i, v−i)− si(v′i; v−i)
]
, ∀v, i, v′i
Ev−i [viyi(v)− si(v)] ≥ 0, ∀v, i
si(v) ≤ B′i, ∀v, i
yi(v) ≥ 0 ∀v, i∑
i
yi(v) ≤ 1 ∀v
(Single)
Our main observation for the above optimization problems is the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3.19. The problems Multi-item and Single are equivalent:
• for any feasible mechanism M(v) = (x(v), p(v)) of problem Multi-item, the
following mechanism Mˆ(v) = (y(v), s(v)) is a feasible mechanism for problem
Single where yi(v) =
ti(v)∑
j qj
, si(v) =
pi(v)∑
j qj
, ∀i ∈ [n].
• for any feasible mechanism Mˆ(v) = (y(v), s(v)) of problem Single, the follow-
ing mechanism M(v) = (x(v), p(v)), where xij(v) = yi(v) ∀i j and pi(v) =
si(v)(
∑
j qj) ∀i, is a feasible mechanism for problem Multi-item.
Proof. The proof is based on direct calculations. First, for any feasible mechanism
M(v) = (x(v), p(v)) of problem Multi-item, let yi(v) =
ti(v)∑
j qj
, si(v) =
pi(v)∑
j qj
, ∀i ∈ [n],
it is not difficult to check that Mˆ(v) = (y(v), s(v)) is a feasible mechanism to Single.
On the other hand side, for any feasible mechanism Mˆ(v) = (y(v), s(v)) of problem
Single, let xij(v) = yi(v) ∀i j, pi(v) = si(v)(
∑
j qj) ∀i, it is easy to show that
M(v) = (x(v), p(v)) is a feasible mechanism for problem Multi-item.
Ultimately, we reduce the multi-item auction design problem to the single-item auc-
tion design problem. By the results of [1] and [6], there exists a 2-approximate mech-
anism for problem Single. Thus, we have a 2-approximate mechanism for problem
Multi-item.
Remark 3.20. For the discrete distribution case, [10] presents an optimal mechanism, for
multi-buyers with multi-items. Their algorithm can be extended to the case where buyers
are budget constrained but not demand constrained. Given buyers’ discrete distribution
and bid profiles, a revised version of their mechanism is an optimal mechanism and
runs in time polynomial in
∑
i |Ti|, where |Ti| is the number of types of buyer i for
all the items. Hence, restricting their results to Multi-item auction, that optimal
mechanism is indeed an optimal mechanism for each buyer having a budget constraint
but no demand constraint, with values independently drawn from discrete distribution,
running in time polynomial in the input.
Chapter 4
Revenue Maximization of
Competitive Equilibrium
We study the revenue maximization problem of various competitive equilibriums in this
chapter. In the simple relaxed demand case, an algorithm to compute an optimal relaxed
competitive equilibrium is presented for the revenue maximization problem. The situa-
tion become complicated for the sharp demand and consecutive demand case. Indeed,
the equilibrium may not exist in these two cases, however, we find a polynomial algo-
rithm to decide whether an equilibrium exists or not and compute a revenue maximizing
one if one does in both settings. Hence, the problems are solved completely.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, the main results are
introduced. We solve the revenue maximization problem for relaxed demand buyers in
Section 4.2. A hardness result for deciding whether a sharp competitive equilibrium
exists or not for general valuation is proposed in Section 4.3. For the sharp demand
and consecutive demand cases, we present polynomial algorithms to decide whether an
equilibrium exists or not and find a revenue maximizing one if it does in Section 4.4 and
4.5 respectively.
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, competitive equilibrium provides a solution concept that
captures both market efficiency and fairness for the buyers. In a competitive equilibrium,
every buyer obtains a best possible allocation that maximizes his own utility and every
unallocated item is priced at zero (i.e., market clearance). Competitive equilibrium is
one of the central solution concepts in economics and has been studied and applied
in a variety of domains [49]. Combining the considerations from the two sides of the
market, an ideal solution concept therefore would be revenue maximizing competitive
equilibrium. Strongly polynomial time is defined in the arithmetic model of computation.
In this model of computation the basic arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division, and comparison) take a unit time step to perform, regardless of
the sizes of the operands.
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Definition 4.1.1 (Strongly Polynomial Time). The algorithm runs in strongly polyno-
mial time if
• the number of operations in the arithmetic model of computation is bounded by
a polynomial in the number of integers in the input instance;
• the space used by the algorithm is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the
input
For relaxed demand buyers, the relaxed competitive equilibrium exhibits almost the
same property of the unit demand model. Since the maximum relaxed competitive
equilibrium always exists, simultaneously the maximum revenue is attained. The result
for relaxed competitive equilibrium are summarized as follows.
Theorem 4.1. There always exists a maximum equilibrium with relaxed demand con-
straint. Further, there is a strongly polynomial time algorithm to compute a maximum
equilibrium (i.e., a revenue maximizing equilibrium).
For sharp multi-unit demand buyers, when the valuations vij are arbitrary, even
determining the existence of a competitive equilibrium is NP-complete (see Section 4.3).
Theorem 4.2. It is NP-hard to determine the existence of a competitive equilibrium
for general valuations in the sharp demand model (even when all demands are 3, and
valuations are 0/1).
For our correlated valuation viqj model, the sharp and consecutive demand buyers
exhibit similar structure properties. As mentioned above, the equilibrium may not exist
and maximum equilibrium may not exist even if the competitive equilibrium exists.
Further , there may exist overpriced items (see Example 2.2.4) in sharp/consecutive
competitive equilibriums.
Theorem 4.3. For sharp multi-unit demand, a sharp competitive equilibrium may not
exist; even if an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, a maximum sharp equilibrium (in
which each price is as high as it can be in any solution) may not exist. Further, there is
a polynomial time algorithm that determines the existence of a sharp equilibrium, and
computes a revenue maximizing one if it does.
The results for consecutive demand buyers are summarized as follows.
Theorem 4.4. For consecutive multi-unit demand, a consecutive competitive equilibri-
um may not exist; even if an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, a maximum consecutive
equilibrium (in which each price is as high as it can be in any solution) may not exist.
Further, if the number of peaks is bounded by a constant number, there is a polynomial
time algorithm that determines the existence of a consecutive equilibrium, and computes
a revenue maximizing one if it does. If the number of peaks is arbitrary, the complexity
of determining the existence of a consecutive equilibrium is NP-hard, and computing
a revenue maximizing consecutive equilibrium is also NP-hard even if the equilibrium
exists.
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Recall K is the number of distinct values in the set {v1, . . . , vn}, and let A1, . . . , AK
be a partition of all buyers where each Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, contains the set of buyers
that have the kth largest value.
4.2 Relaxed Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we study relaxed competitive equilibrium and assume that buyer i can
win any number of items, upper bounded by di. That is, in a feasible output (p,X), we
only require that |Xi| ≤ di for each buyer i.
The difference between Definition 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 is that in Definition 2.2.1, for
relaxed demand, any buyer i does not envy any other subset S of size |S| ≤ di, whereas
in Definition 2.2.2, for sharp demand, i does not envy any subset S of size |S| = di.
Hence, in the relaxed multi-unit demand model, as buyers are interested in a larger set
of candidate items, the definition of envy-freeness is stronger.
Given the new notion of relaxed envy-freeness, we have the following new definition
for relaxed competitive equilibrium.
Definition 4.2.1 (Relaxed Maximum Equilibrium). A price vector p is called a relaxed
maximum equilibrium price vector if for any other relaxed equilibrium price vector q,
pj ≥ qj for every item j. An relaxed equilibrium (p,X) is called a relaxed maximum
equilibrium if p is a relaxed maximum price vector.
Still we are interested in computing revenue maximizing relaxed competitive equi-
librium. Actually, we compute the relaxed maximum equilibrium, which simultaneously
is a revenue maximizing equilibrium.
Lemma 4.5. For any relaxed envy-free solution (p,X), there is no overpriced item in
(p,X).
Proof. Suppose there is an item j which is allocated to buyer i and j is overpriced (i.e.,
pj > viqj), then i would get more utility from the bundle Xi\{j} than Xi, which is a
contradiction.
Lemma 4.6. For any relaxed envy-free solution (p,X), suppose i is a winner, then for
any buyer i′ with vi′ > vi, i′ is a winner as well. In addition, the number of items that
i′ wins equals di′, i.e., |Xi′ | = di′.
Proof. Since i is a winner, by the above Lemma 4.5, for any j ∈ Xi, vi′qj > viqj ≥ pj .
That is, i′ is able to obtain a positive utility from j. This implies that i′ must be a winner.
Further, if |Xi′ | < di′ , then i′ would envy bundle Xi′ ∪{j}, which is a contradiction.
Another significant difference between the relaxed demand models and sharp/consec-
utive demand is that a maximum competitive equilibrium may not exist in the sharp/-
consecutive demand model (as shown by Example 2.2.2), whereas as we will see in the
next subsection, a relaxed maximum equilibrium always exists in the relaxed demand
model.
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4.2.1 Maximum Equilibrium
Theorem 4.7. There always exists a relaxed maximum equilibrium with relaxed demand
constraint. Further, there is a strongly polynomial time algorithm to compute a relaxed
maximum equilibrium (i.e., a revenue maximizing relaxed equilibrium).
Now we present the algorithm to compute a relaxed maximum equilibrium. Such an
algorithm denoted by alg-meq have two steps. The first step is to select the winner set
and the second step to allocate items and settle prices.
alg-max-eq
1. Assume buyers are ordered by i1, . . . , in where vi1 ≥ · · · ≥ vin.
2. Let imax = arg mink
∑
j=1,...,k dij ≥ m and S∗ = {i1, . . . , imax}.
3. Allocation X∗
• Let X∗i = ∅ for each buyer i /∈ S∗.
• Allocate items to buyers in S∗ according to the following rules:
Buyers with larger values obtain items with larger qualities.
(Note that imax gets min
{
dimax , m−
∑
i∈S∗\{imax} di
}
items.)
4. Price p∗
• Let p∗j = 0 for each unallocated item j.
• Let p∗j = vimaxqj for each item j ∈ X∗imax.
• For each remaining item j in the reverse order.
– let iu be the buyer that wins item j.
– let k be the item with the smallest index that iu+1 wins.
– let p∗j = viu(qj − qk) + p∗k.
5. Output the tuple (p∗,X∗).
Proof of Theorem 4.7. It is easy to see that alg-max-eq takes strongly polynomial
time. Consider any relaxed competitive equilibrium (p,X) and let S = {i | Xi 6= ∅} be
its set of winners. By the rule of defining S∗ and Lemma 4.6, we know that S ⊆ S∗.
If S ⊂ S∗, then imax /∈ S (recall that imax = max(S)) and there is an item j which is
not allocated to any buyer in (p,X); thus, pj = 0. This would imply that imax is not
envy-free in (p,X), a contradiction. Hence, we have S = S∗. By the allocation and
pricing rules of alg-max-eq, we know that the price vector p∗ computed by alg-max-
eq is a maximum relaxed price vector and the tuple (p∗,X∗) is a relaxed maximum
equilibrium.
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4.3 Hardness of General Valuations of Sharp Competitive
Equilibrium
Theorem 4.8. It is NP-hard to determine the existence of a sharp competitive equilib-
rium for general valuations in the sharp demand model (even when all demands are 3,
and valuations are 0/1).
Proof. We reduce from exact cover by 3-sets (X3C): Given a ground setA = {a1, . . . , a3n}
and a collection of subsets S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ A where |Si| = 3 for each i, we are asked whether
there are n subsets that cover all elements in A. Given an instance of X3C, we construct
a market with 3n + 3 items and 9n + m + 1 buyers as follows. Every element in A
corresponds to an item; further, we introduce another three items B = {b1, b2, b3}. We
use index j to denote one item. For each subset Si, there is a buyer with value vij = 1
if j ∈ Si and vij = 0 otherwise; further, for every possible subset {x, y, z} where x ∈ A
and y, z ∈ B, there is a buyer with value vij = 1 if j ∈ {x, y, z} and vij = 0 otherwise;
finally, there is a buyer with value vij = 1 if j ∈ B and vij = 0 otherwise. The demand
of every buyer is 3.
We claim that there is a positive answer to the X3C instance if and only if there
is a sharp competitive equilibrium in the constructed market. Assume that there is
T ∈ {S1, . . . , Sm} with |T | = n that covers all elements in A. Then we allocate items in
A to the buyers in T and allocate B to the buyer who desires B, and set all prices to be
1. It can be seen that this defines a sharp competitive equilibrium.
On the other hand, assume that there is a sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X). We
first claim that all items are allocated out in the sharp equilibrium. Otherwise, there
must exist an item aj ∈ A that is not allocated to any buyer. (If all unallocated items
just belonged to B, then all 3 items in B would be unallocated, contradicting envy-
freeness of the buyer who values B.) Then we have paj = 0. Consider the buyers who
desire subsets {aj , b1, b2}, {aj , b1, b3}, {aj , b2, b3}. They do not win since aj is not sold.
Due to envy-freeness, we have
pb1 + pb2 ≥ 3
pb1 + pb3 ≥ 3
pb2 + pb3 ≥ 3
This implies that pb1 + pb2 + pb3 ≥ 4.5. Hence, the buyer who desires B cannot afford
the price of B and at least one item in B, say b1, is not allocated out. Thus pb1 = 0 and
pb2 + pb3 ≥ 4.5. This contradicts envy-freeness of the buyer who gets b2 and b3.
Now since all items in A are allocated out, because of the construction of the market,
we have to allocate all items in A to n buyers and allocate B to one buyer; the former
gives a solution to the X3C instance.
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4.4 Computation of Sharp Competitive Equilibrium
It is well known that a sharp competitive equilibrium always exists for unit demand
buyers (even for general vij valuations) [55]; for our sharp multi-unit demand model,
however, a sharp competitive equilibrium may not exist. In the unit (relaxed) demand
case, it is well-known that the set of equilibrium prices forms a distributive lattice; hence,
there exist extremes which correspond to the maximum and the minimum equilibrium
price vectors. In our multi-unit demand model, however, even if a sharp competitive
equilibrium exists, sharp maximum equilibrium prices may not exist. Because of the
sharp multi-unit demand, an interesting and important property is that it is possible
that some items are ‘over-priced’; this is a significant difference between sharp multi-unit
and unit (relaxed) demand models (see Example 2.2.4).
We have the following characterization for over-priced items in an equilibrium solu-
tion.
Lemma 4.9. For any given sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X), the following claims
hold:
• If there is any unallocated item, then there are no over-priced items.
• At most one winner can have over-priced items; further, that winner, say i, must be
the one with the smallest value among all winners in the sharp equilibrium (p,X).
That is, for any other winner i′ 6= i, we have vi′ > vi.
Proof. The first claim is obvious since any unallocated item j′ is priced at 0; thus if
there is a winner i and item j ∈ Xi such that pj > viqj , then i would envy the subset
Xi ∪ {j′} \ {j}.
To prove the second claim, suppose there are two winners i, i′ where vi ≥ vi′ , and
suppose that i has over-priced item j. Since i′ is envy-free, his own utility must be
non-negative; we know there is an item j′ ∈ Xi′ such that vi′qj′ ≥ pj′ . This implies that
viqj′ ≥ pj′ ; thus, i would envy the subset Xi ∪ {j′} \ {j}, a contradiction.
4.4.1 Properties
We present some observations regarding sharp envy-freeness and sharp competitive e-
quilibrium. Our first observation implies that a winner is sharp envy-free if and only if
he prefers each of his allocated items to any other item.
Lemma 4.10. Given any solution (p,X) and any winner i, if i is sharp envy-free then
vij − pj ≥ vij′ − pj′ for any items j ∈ Xi and j′ /∈ Xi. On the other hand, if i is not
sharp envy-free, then there is j ∈ Xi and j′ /∈ Xi such that vij − pj < vij′ − pj′.
Proof. If i is sharp envy-free but (for j ∈ Xi and j′ /∈ Xi) vij − pj < vij′ − pj′ , it is
easy to see that i would envy subset Xi ∪ {j′} \ {j}, a contradiction. If i is not sharp
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envy-free, then there is a subset T of items with |T | = di such that
∑
j∈Xi(vij − pj) <∑
j′∈T (vij′ − pj′). Since |Xi| = |T |, the inequality holds for at least one item, i.e., there
is j ∈ Xi and j′ /∈ Xi such that vij − pj < vij′ − pj′ .
Lemma 4.11. For any sharp envy-free solution (p,X), suppose there are two buyers
i, i′ with values vi > vi′ and two items j and j′ that are allocated to i and i′ respectively,
i.e., j ∈ Xi and j′ ∈ Xi′. Then qj ≥ qj′.
Proof. By the above Lemma 4.10, we have
viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′
vi′qj′ − pj′ ≥ vi′qj − pj
Adding the two inequalities together, we get (vi− vi′)(qj − qj′) ≥ 0, yielding the desired
result.
Lemma 4.11 implies that in any sharp envy-free solution, the allocation of items is
monotone in terms of their amount of qualities and the values of the winners, i.e., winners
with larger values win items with larger qualities. However, it does not imply that the
value of every winner is larger than or equal to the value of any loser. For instance,
consider three buyers i1, i2, i3 and two items j1, j2 with qj1 = 2 and qj2 = 1. The values
and demands are vi1 = 1.3, vi2 = 1, vi3 = 0.9 and di1 = 1, di2 = 2, di3 = 1. Then prices
pj1 = 2.2, pj2 = 0.9 and allocations Xi1 = {j1}, Xi2 = ∅, Xi3 = {j2} constitute a revenue
maximizing sharp envy-free solution. In this solution, vi2 > vi3 , but i2 does not win any
item (because of the sharp demand constraint) whereas i3 wins item j2.
Lemma 4.12. If there is a sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X), then for any winner
i, item j ∈ Xi and unallocated item j′, we have qj ≥ qj′.
Proof. Since item j′ is not allocated to any buyer, its price pj′ = 0. By sharp envy-
freeness, we have viqj ≥ viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′ = viqj′ , which implies that qj ≥ qj′ .
By the above characterization, in any sharp competitive equilibrium, all allocated
items have larger qualities. Hence, by Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12, we know that if the
set of winners is fixed in a sharp competitive equilibrium, the allocation is determined
implicitly as well. On the other hand, we observe that Lemma 4.12 does not hold if
(p,X) is a (revenue maximizing) sharp envy-free solution. For instance, consider two
buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 10, vi2 = 1 and demand di1 = 1, di2 = 10, and twelve
items j1, j2, . . . , j12 with qualities qj1 = 10, qj2 = 5, qj3 = · · · = qj12 = 1. It can be seen
that in the optimal sharp envy-free solution, we set prices pj1 = 91, pj2 =∞, pj3 = · · · =
pj12 = 1, and allocate Xi1 = {j1}, Xi2 = {j3, . . . , j12}, which generates total revenue
91 + 10 = 101. In this solution, qj2 > qj3 = · · · = qj12 , but item j2 is not allocated to
any buyer.
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Lemma 4.13. Given a sharp envy-free solution (p,X), a loser ` and any subset T of
d` items, the following property cannot hold:
A non-empty subset of items in T are either allocated to winners with values smaller
than v` or priced at 0; any other elements of T are allocated to winners having the same
value v` as `.
Note that Lemma 4.13 is not only for sharp equilibrium but also available for sharp
envy-free solutions.
Proof. Let (p,X) be a sharp envy-free pair of price and allocation vectors. Given the
loser ` and T satisfying the conditions of the statement of the lemma, we show how to
construct a set T ′ of items that ` envies.
Let T = T0 ∪ T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ts be a partition of T where T0 consists of items priced at 0
in (p,X) and for i > 0, Ti = T ∩Xi. Note that any non-empty Ti satisfies vi ≤ v`, and
if T0 = ∅ then Ti 6= ∅ for some i > 0 with vi < v`.
Note that T0 satisfies
∑
j∈T0 viqj − pj ≥ 0, where the inequality is strict if T0 is
non-empty. Let T ′0 = T0.
Consider any non-empty Ti (with i > 0). Let T
′
i be the |Ti| items j ∈ Xi that
maximize viqj−pj . We have
∑
j∈T ′i viqj−pj ≥ 0. Hence
∑
j∈T ′i v`qj−pj ≥ 0, with strict
inequality if vi < v`.
Summing these inequalities, we have
∑s
i=0
∑
j∈T ′i v`qj − pj ≥ 0, and in fact the
inequality is strict since at least one of the s+ 1 inequalities is strict. Let T ′ = T ′0 ∪T ′1 ∪
· · · ∪ T ′s; |T ′| = |T | = d` and we have shown that ` envies T ′.
4.4.2 Algorithm
Our main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 4.14. There is a polynomial algorithm to determine the existence of a sharp
competitive equilibrium; and if one exists, it computes a revenue maximizing sharp equi-
librium.
Thus, both the existence problem and the maximization problem become tractable,
as a result of the correlated valuations vij = viqj .
The algorithm, calledMax-CE, is divided into two steps. The first step is to compute
a set of ‘candidate’ winners if an equilibrium exists. The second step is to calculate a
‘candidate’ equilibrium and verify if it is indeed a (revenue maximizing) equilibrium.
Let Ak, 1 ≤ k ≤ K denotes all the buyers with the kth largest value in {v1, v2, · · · , vn}.
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Max-CE stage 1.
1. Let S∗ ← ∅ be the set of candidate winners
2. Let k ← 1 and let D ← m be the number of ‘‘available items’’
3. While k ≤ K
• If di > D for every i ∈ Ak, let k ← k + 1
• Else
– Let S = {i | i ∈ Ak, di ≤ D}
– If
∑
i∈S di > D
(a) If there is S′ ⊆ S s.t. ∑i∈S′ di = D
let S∗ ← S∗ ∪ S′, and goto Max-CE stage 2
(b) Else, a sharp competitive equilibrium does not
exist, and return
– Else
∑
i∈S di ≤ D
(c) Let S∗ ← S∗ ∪ S, D ← D −∑i∈S di, k ← k + 1
4. Goto Max-CE stage 2
Note that in the above step 3(a) we check whether there is S′ ⊆ S such that∑
i∈S′ di = D; this is equivalent to solving a subset sum problem. However, in our
instance, each demand satisfies di ≤ m. Hence, a dynamic programming approach can
solve the problem in time O(n2m). Hence, stage 1 runs in strongly polynomial time.
An input to Max-CE is all the n buyers with valuation vi and demand di and all
the m items with qualities qj .
Lemma 4.15. If an input to Max-CE has a sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X), then
stage 1 will not return that a sharp equilibrium does not exist at step 3(b).
Proof. Let (p,X) be a sharp competitive equilibrium of an input to Max-CE. In this
proof, when we refer to winning/losing buyers, or allocated/unallocated items, we mean
with respect to (p,X). In particular, let W be the set of winners of (p,X).
Suppose that Max-CE stage 1 exits on the k-th iteration of the loop. We claim
that during the first k−1 iterations, all buyers added to S∗ must be winners. To see this,
suppose alternatively that at iteration k′ < k, buyer ` is the first loser to be added to
S∗. In that case, ` has d` items that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.13, contradicting
sharp envy-freeness. (Suppose that the winners found by the algorithm during the first
k′ − 1 iterations are given their allocation in (p,X). At iteration k′, the algorithm has
more than d` available items, some of which are allocated to buyers with value less than
`, or are unallocated.)
At the final iteration k we must have S 6= ∅ (otherwise the algorithm will begin a new
iteration). Since
∑
i∈S di > D, we have S\W 6= ∅ (members of S have too much demand
for them all to be able to win). Since there is no subset S′ ⊆ S such that ∑i∈S′ di = D,
we have
∑
i∈S∩W di < D. Hence, there are items that are not allocated to buyers in
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S∗ ∪ (S ∩ W ). Let i′ ∈ S \ W ; we can find di′ items that satisfy the condition of
Lemma 4.13, implying that a buyer in S\W is not sharp envy-free, a contradiction.
Lemma 4.16. A revenue maximizing sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X) can be con-
verted to one with equal revenue whose winning set is S∗.
Proof. Assume that the given instance has a sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X) and
that Max-CE enters Max-CE stage 2 at the kth iteration with the set of candidates
S∗. Let W be the set of winners of (p,X), and let W ′ = W ∩ (A1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1) and
W ′′ = W \W ′. Let S1 = S∗ ∩ (A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1) and S2 = S∗ \ S1 (note that S2 ⊆ Ak).
From the analysis of the above lemma and Lemma 4.13, we know that (i) W ′ = S1, (ii)
W ′′ ⊆ Ak, and (iii)
∑
i∈W ′′ di =
∑
i∈S2 di. Thus, the only difference between S
∗ and W
lies in the selection of buyers in Ak (this is due to possibly multiple choices in step 3(a)
in Max-CE stage 1). Due to envy-freeness, we have∑
i∈W ′′\S2
ui(p,X) =
∑
i∈W ′′\S2
∑
j∈Xi
(viqj − pj) ≥ 0 ≥
∑
i∈S2\W ′′
ui(p,X)
Since all buyers in W ′′ \ S2 and S2 \W ′′ have the same value, we know that the above
inequalities are tight. Thus, if we reassign the items in ∪i∈W ′′Xi to the buyers in S2
and keep the same prices, the resulting output will still be a sharp equilibrium.
Given the above characterization, the second step of the algorithm Max-CE is de-
scribed as follows.
Max-CE stage 2.
5. Allocation X∗ is constructed as follows:
• Let X∗i ← ∅, for each buyer i /∈ S∗
• For each i ∈ S∗ in non-increasing order of vi
– allocate di of the remaining items to i in non-increasing
order of qj
6. Price p∗ is computed according to the following linear program:
max
∑
i∈S∗
∑
j∈X∗i p
∗
j
s.t. p∗j ≥ 0 ∀ j
p∗j = 0 ∀ j /∈ ∪i∈S∗X∗i
viqj − p∗j ≥ viqj′ − p∗j′ ∀ i ∈ S∗, j ∈ X∗i , j′ /∈ X∗i∑
j∈T (viqj − p∗j ) ≤ 0 ∀ i /∈ S∗, T with |T | = di
7. If the above linear program has a feasible solution, output the tuple
(p∗,X∗)
8. Else, return that a sharp competitive equilibrium does not exist
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In the above LP, there are m variables where each item j has a variable p∗j . The first
two constraints ensure that the price vector is a set of feasible market clearing prices.
The third condition guarantees that all winners are envy-free. The last condition says
that for each loser i and any subset of items T with T = |di|, i cannot obtain a positive
utility from T . Notice that it is possible that there are exponentially many combinations
of T ; thus the LP has an exponential number of constraints. However, observe that for
any given solution p∗, it is easy to verify if p∗ is a feasible solution of the LP or find a
violated constraint. In particular, for every loser i, we can order all items j in decreasing
order of viqj−p∗j and verify the subset T composed of the first di items; if i cannot obtain
a positive utility from such T , then i is envy-free. Therefore, there is a separation oracle
to the LP, and thus, the ellipsoid method can solve the LP in polynomial time. Hence,
the total running time of Max-CE is in polynomial time.
If the algorithm returns a tuple (p∗,X∗), certainly it is a sharp competitive equi-
librium; further, it is a revenue maximizing sharp equilibrium because of the objective
function in the LP. It is therefore sufficient to show the following claim to complete the
proof of Theorem 4.14.
Lemma 4.17. If there exists a sharp competitive equilibrium, then stage 2 will not
claim that an equilibrium does not exist at step 8.
Proof. If there is a sharp competitive equilibrium (p,X), let W be the set of winners of
the equilibrium. By Lemma 4.15, we know that Max-CE will enter Max-CE stage 2.
By the above discussions, we know that W and S∗ only differ in the last kth iteration of
the main loop of Max-CE stage 1 and replacing all winners in W ∩ Ak with S∗ ∩ Ak
gives a sharp equilibrium as well. Further, by Lemma 4.11 and 4.12, the allocation of
items to the winners in W is fixed. Hence, the sharp equilibrium price vector p gives
a feasible solution to the LP in the stage 2, which implies that the algorithm will not
claim that a sharp equilibrium does not exist.
4.5 Consecutive Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we study the revenue maximizing consecutive competitive equilibrium
in the full information setting. To simplify the following discussions, we sort all buyers
and items in non-increasing order of their values, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
We say an allocation Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn) is efficient if Y maximizes the total
social welfare e.g.
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi vij is maximized over all the possible allocations. We call
p = (p1, p2, · · · , pm) an equilibrium price if there exists consecutive an allocation X such
that (X,p) is a competitive equilibrium. The following lemma is implicitly stated in
[38], for completeness, we’ll prove it.
Lemma 4.18. Let allocation Y be efficient, then for any equilibrium price p, (Y,p) is
a consecutive competitive equilibrium.
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Proof. Since p is an equilibrium price, there exists an allocation X such that (X,p)
is a consecutive competitive equilibrium. As a result, by consecutive envy-freeness,
ui(X,p) ≥ ui(Y,p) for any i ∈ [n]. Let T = [m]\ ∪i Yi, then we have
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj ≥
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj
=
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
vij −
∑
i
∑
j∈Xi
pj =
∑
i
ui(X,p)
≥
∑
i
ui(Y,p) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
pj
=
∑
i
∑
j∈Yi
vij −
m∑
j=1
pj +
∑
j∈T
pj
where the first inequality is due to Y being efficient and first equality due to ui(X,p)
being consecutive competitive equilibrium (unallocated item priced at 0). Therefore,∑
j∈T pj = 0 and the above inequalities are all equalities. ∀i : ui(X,p) = ui(Y,p).
Further, because the price is the same,
∀i a loser ∀Z consecutive items and |Z| = di, we have ui(Z) ≤ 0.
∀i a winner ∀Z consecutive items and |Z| = di, we have
ui(Yi) = ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Z).
Therefore, (Y,p) is a consecutive competitive equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.18, to find a revenue maximizing consecutive competitive equilibrium,
we can first find an efficient allocation and then use linear programming to settle the
prices. We develop the following dynamic programming to find an efficient allocation.
We first only consider there is one peak in the quality order of items. The case with
constant peaks is similar to the above approaches, for general peak case, as shown in
above Theorem 3.18, finding one consecutive competitive equilibrium is NP-hard if the
competitive equilibrium exists, and determining existence of consecutive competitive
equilibrium is also NP-hard.
Recall that all the values are sorted in non-increasing order e.g. v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
g[s, l, r] denotes the maximized value of social welfare when we only consider first s
buyers and the allocation of s is exactly the interval [l, r]. Then we have the following
transition function.
g[s, l, r] = max

g[s− 1, l, r]
g[s− 1, l, r − ds] + vs
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
g[s− 1, l + ds, r] + vs
∑l+ds−1
j=l qj
(4.1)
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By tracking procedure 4.1, an efficient allocation denoted by X∗ = (X∗1 , X∗2 , · · · , X∗n)
can be found. The price p∗ such that (X∗,p∗) is a revenue maximization consecutive
competitive equilibrium can be determined from the following linear programming. Let
Ti be any consecutive number of di slots, for all i ∈ [n].
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈X∗i
pj
s.t. pj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ [m]
pj = 0 ∀ j /∈ ∪i∈[n]X∗i∑
j∈X∗i
(viqj − pj) ≥
∑
j′∈Ti
(viqj′ − pj′) ∀ i ∈ [n]
∑
j∈X∗i
(viqj − pj) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Clearly there is only a polynomial number of constraints. The constraints in the first
line represent that all the prices are non negative (no positive transfers). The constraint
in the second lines means unallocated items must be priced at zero (market clearance
condition). And the constraint in third line contains two aspects of information. First
for all the losers e.g. loser k with Xk = ∅, the utility k gets from any consecutive
number of dk is no more than zero, which makes all the losers envy-free. The second
aspect is that the winners e.g. winner i with Xi 6= ∅ must receive a bundle with di
consecutive slots maximizing its utility over all di consecutive slots, which together with
the constraint in fourth line (winners’ utilities are non negative) guarantees that all
winners are consecutive envy-free.
Theorem 4.19. If the number of peaks is upper bounded by a constant. Then there
is a polynomial time algorithm to decide whether there exists a consecutive competitive
equilibrium or not and to compute a revenue maximizing consecutive market equilibrium
if one does exist. If the number of peaks is arbitrary, both problems (deciding existence
or computing the maximum one if one does exist) is NP-hard.
Proof. The efficient allocation can be found efficiently if the number of peaks is bounded
by a constant, see Theorem 3.17. Clearly the above linear programming and procedure
(4.1) run in polynomial time. If the linear programming output a price p∗, then by
its constraint conditions, (X∗,p∗) must be a consecutive competitive equilibrium. On
the other hand, if there exists a consecutive competitive equilibrium (X,p) then by
Lemma 4.18, (X∗,p) is a consecutive competitive equilibrium, providing a feasible so-
lution of the above linear programming. By the objective of the linear programming,
we know it must be a revenue maximizing one. For the general peak case, as shown
in the above Theorem 3.18, finding one consecutive competitive equilibrium is NP-hard
if the competitive equilibrium exists since finding the efficient allocation is NP-hard,
and determining existence of competitive equilibrium is also NP-hard. This is because
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that considering the instance in the proof of Theorem 3.18, it is not difficult to see the
constructed instance has an equilibrium if and only if 3 partition has a solution.
Chapter 5
Revenue Maximization of
Envy-free Multi-unit Models
We study revenue maximization problems of various envy-free buyers in this chapter.
The main work of this chapter focuses on relaxed/sharp/consecutive demand buyers.
For the relaxed demand case, as before, the problem is simple, which can be solved
completely by dynamic programming as shown in Section 5.2. The circumstances become
difficult for sharp demand cases. Indeed, if the demand of the buyers is arbitrary, the
problem is NP-hard, however, for the very important case where buyers’ demands are
bounded by a constant, a polynomial algorithm is presented to compute an optimal
sharp envy-free solution. The cases for consecutive demand buyers are still very hard.
If the demand is arbitrary, the problem is NP-hard even if all the qualities are the same,
yet, for uniform demand buyers, we present a polynomial algorithm solving the problems
if the qualities are ordered from top to down. Some partial results on bundle envy-free
buyers and budgets constraint buyers are also given.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin in Section 5.1 to present the main
results in this chapter. Next, the revenue maximization problem for relaxed demand
buyers is totally solved in Section 5.2. For sharp envy-freeness, the general demand case
is NP-hard, see Section 5.4, however, a polynomial algorithm is presented to find an
optimal envy-free solution when the demand is bounded by a constant in Section 5.3.
The problem becomes more difficult in consecutive demand cases. Indeed, the problem is
NP-hard even if all the qualities are all the same, yet, a polynomial algorithm is presented
when the buyers have common demand in Section 5.5. Some results on bundle envy-
freeness are presented in Section 5.6. Studies on identical items with budgets for relaxed
demand buyers are shown in Section 5.7.
5.1 Introduction
First, we present the positive result for relaxed envy-free solutions as follows.
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Theorem 5.1. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm to compute a revenue
maximizing (maximum) relaxed envy-free solution with relaxed demand constraint.
The NP-hardness result of [39] for unit demand buyers implies that we cannot hope
for a polynomial time algorithm for general vij valuations in the multi-unit demand
setting, even for the very special case when one has positive values for at most three
items [14]. However, it does not rule out positive computational results for special, but
important, cases of multi-unit demand. For viqj valuations with multi-unit demand,
where the hardness reductions of [14, 39] does not apply, we have the following results.
Theorem 5.2. There is a polynomial time algorithm that computes a revenue maximiz-
ing sharp envy-free solution in the sharp multi-unit demand model with viqj valuations
if the demand of every buyer is bounded by a constant. On the other hand, the problem
is NP-hard if the sharp demand is arbitrary, even if there are only three buyers.
Here, we have a complete overview of sharp/consecutive envy-free pricing with multi-
unit demand buyers. Most of our results are positive, suggesting that sharp/consecutive
envy-free pricing are candidate solution concepts to be applicable in the domains where
the valuations are correlated with respect to the quality of the items.
We prove that it is NP-hard to compute an optimal sharp envy-free solution even if
there are only three buyers. Hence, our efforts focus on the special, yet very important
bounded-demand case. To compute an optimal sharp envy-free solution for bounded
demand, certain candidate winner sets (the number of such sets is polynomial) are
defined and found; and crucially, there is at least one optimal winner set in our selected
candidate winner sets. For each candidate winner set, if the demand is bounded by a
constant, we present a linear programming to characterize its optimal solution when the
allocation is known. Finally, a dynamic programming algorithm is provided to find the
allocation sets when a candidate winner set is fixed. Both the linear programming and
the dynamic programming run in polynomial time. For consecutive demand buyers, the
problem of revenue maximizing consecutive envy-free solution is NP-hard. However, for
the very important case that the qualities are order from top to bottom, and all the
buyers’ demands are the same, a polynomial algorithm would be presented to compute
maximum revenue of consecutive envy-free solutions.
Theorem 5.3. The revenue maximization problem of consecutive envy-free buyers is
NP-hard even if all the qualities are the same.
Definition 5.1.1 (Uniform Demand). We say buyers have uniform demands if all the
buyers have the same demand in the model.
Definition 5.1.2 (PTAS). An algorithm is called a polynomial time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for a given problem with input I if for any  > 0, the algorithm runs in
time polynomial in the size of input I to output a solution with value M(I) such that
M(I) ≥ (1− )OPT (I), where OPT (I) is the optimal value of the problem.
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For bundle envy-free case, the situation become much complicated, yet we still have
some positive results. Noting that taking budget into consideration, each winner i’s
payment should be no more than bi e.g.
∑
j∈Xi pj ≤ bi.
Theorem 5.4. For bundle envy-free pricing, each buyer only having uniform demand
constraints, a PTAS is presented for identical items and an exponential time algorithm
is presented for distinct items with valuation viqj; for relaxed envy-free pricing, each
buyer only have budget constraints, an optimal algorithm is proposed for identical items.
See Section 5.6 and 5.7 for the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Recall K is the number of distinct values in the set A = {v1, . . . , vn}, and A1, . . . , AK
is a partition of all buyers where each Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, contains the set of buyers
that have the kth largest value.
5.2 Relaxed Envy-Free Pricing
Theorem 5.5. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm to compute a revenue
maximizing relaxed envy-free solution with relaxed demand constraint.
Next we present an algorithm denoted by alg-rle-ef to solve the relaxed envy-
free pricing problem. Suppose S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} to be a candidate winner set and
T = {j1, j2, . . . , j`} a subset of items, where i1 < i2 < · · · < it, j1 < j2 < · · · < j` and
d(S\{it}) < ` ≤ d(S). Let X be the allocation produced by the following procedure
denoted by rle-allocation.
rle-allocation
Allocation X:
• Let Xi ← ∅, for each buyer i /∈ S
• For each i ∈ S\{it} with the decreasing order of vi
– buers with smaller indices obtain items with smaller indices
• allocate all the remaining items in T to it
It is easy to check rle-allocation takes strongly polynomial time.
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alg-rle-ef
1. If d(A) ≤ m, let kmax ← K
2. Else let kmax = arg mink d
(
A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak
) ≥ m
3. For k = 1 to kmax
• Let L← d(A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1) and imin = |⋃k−1i=1 Ai|
• If k < kmax let `← d(Ak); else let `← m− L
• For r = 1 to `
– let imax = arg minj
∑j
i=imin+1
di ≥ `
– let S = {1, 2, . . . , imax}
– let T = {z1, z2, . . . , zL+`} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with z1 < z2 < · · · < zL+` be
items to be defined
– run rle-allocation on S and T getting X, let wj ← vi if j ∈
Xi
– Pricing getting price vector p as follows
let pj =∞ for j /∈ T;
let pzL+` = wL+`qzL+` and pzj = wj(qzj − qzj+1) + pzj+1, for j ∈
T\{zL+`}
– getting T = {z1, z2, . . . , zL+`} from the optimal solution of the
following optimization
problem and denote the optimal value as Rk,w
Maximize R =
L+∑`
j=1
(jwj − (j − 1)wj−1)qzj
Subject to z1 < z2 < · · · < zL+`, {z1, z2, . . . , zL+`} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
4. Let Rk
∗,r∗ = max{Rk,r} and (p,X) be the corresponding tuple to Rk∗,r∗;
Output Rk
∗,r∗ and the tuple (p,X)
Since the optimization problem of alg-rle-ef can be solved by dynamic program-
ming method as in Solve-DLP (see subsection 5.3.5) in strongly polynomial time, the
time taken in alg-rle-ef is strongly polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. We need to prove alg-rle-ef actually outputs an optimal solu-
tion. First, it is easy to check our output is a relaxed envy-free solution. Second, there
must be an optimal winner set (a set is called an optimal winner set if there exists a
optimal relaxed envy-free solution such that the set is the winner set for this optimal
relaxed envy-free solution) in our select possible winner sets like S. For any optimal
winner set S′, suppose there is an optimal solution (p′,X′) corresponding to S′. Sup-
pose imax = max{i ∈ S′} and imax ∈ Ak, suppose w = |S′ ∩Ak|, then it is easy to check
that Rk,r ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈X′i
p′j . Hence, the output is an optimal relaxed envy-free solution.
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5.3 Algorithm for Constant Sharp Demands
We noted earlier that a sharp envy-free solution always exists. We may use envy-free
instead of sharp envy-free alternatively in this section for convenience if there is no
confusion. Our main results are the following.
Theorem 5.6. If the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, then the revenue-
maximizing sharp envy-free pricing problem can be solved in polynomial time.
We note that the correlated viqj valuations are crucial to derive an efficient com-
putation when the demands are bounded by a constant; in contrast, for unit-demand,
the sharp envy-free pricing is NP-hard for general valuations vij even if every buyer is
interested in at most three items [14].
Throughout this section, let ∆ be a constant where di ≤ ∆ for any buyer i, and
again, buyers and items are sorted according to their values and qualities. For any tuple
(p,X), we assume that all unsold items are priced at∞. This assumption is without loss
of generality for sharp envy-freeness. We will first explore some important properties
of an (optimal) sharp envy-free solution, then at the end of the section present our
algorithm.
5.3.1 Candidate Winner Sets
For a given set S of buyers, let max(S) and min(S) denote the buyer in S that has
the largest and smallest index (buyers are indexed in increasing order with their values
decreasing), respectively.
Definition 5.3.1 (Candidate Winner Set). Given a subset of buyers S 6= ∅, let k =
max{r|Ar ∩ S 6= ∅}. We say S is a candidate winner set if the total demand of buyers
in S is at most m, i.e., d(S) ≤ m, and for any i ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1 \ S, di >
∑
i′∈S: i′>i
di′ .
The definition of candidate winner set is closely related to sharp envy-freeness. In-
deed, due to Lemma 4.13, the above definition defines a slightly larger set (than all
possible sets of winners in sharp envy-free solutions) as the inequality does not consider
all the buyers completely in the same value category vj . However, this definition makes
it easier for us to describe and analyze the algorithm.
Proposition 5.7. For any sharp envy-free solution (p,X), let S = {i | Xi 6= ∅} be the
set of winners. Then S is either a candidate winner set or S = ∅.
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemma 4.13.
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FindWinners(S): Input a set of buyers S
• Let imax = max(S) and assume imax ∈ Ak
• Initially let WS = S
• For each buyer j ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1 in reverse order
– If j /∈ S and dj ≤
∑
i∈WS : i>j
di, let WS ←WS ∪ {j}
• Return WS
Proposition 5.8. For any subset of buyers S, let WS =FindWinners(S).
• If d(WS) ≤ m, then WS is a candidate winner set and for any candidate winner
set S′ ⊇ S, WS ⊆ S′.
• If d(WS) > m, then there is no candidate winner set containing S.
Proof. Obviously, if d(WS) ≤ m, then from the definition of candidate winner set, we
know WS is a candidate winner set. Still, by the definition of candidate winner set,
for any j in WS\S, any candidate winner set S′ ⊇ S, since dj ≤
∑
i∈WS : i>j
di, then
dj ≤
∑
i∈S′: i>j
di (since S
′ ⊇ S), thus, j ∈ S′, hence, WS ⊆ S′. Therefore, the second
statement follows.
FindLoser(S): Input a candidate winner set S
• Let imin = min(S) and assume imin ∈ Aj
• Initially let LS = ∅, and α =∞
• For each k = j, j + 1, . . . ,K
– Let i0 = arg min{di | i ∈ Ak\ S}
– If di0 < α, let LS ← LS ∪ {i0} and α← di0
• Return LS
Proposition 5.9. For any given tuple (p,X) with winner set S, suppose that S is a
candidate winner set and let LS =FindLoser(S). If all losers in LS are sharp envy-free
with respect to (p,X), then all other losers are sharp envy-free as well.
Proof. For any i ∈ LS , if i is sharp envy-free, then for any subset T of items with
|T | = di,
∑
j∈T (viqj − pj) ≤ 0. Hence, for any v ≤ vi and T ′ with |T ′| ≥ di (Consider
sum of vqj−pj over all the elements j of subset T with di of T ′, then each value vqj−pj
is counted by
(|T ′|−1
di−1
)
times), we have
∑
j∈T ′
(vqj−pj) = 1(|T ′|−1
di−1
) ∑
T⊆T ′,|T |=di
∑
j∈T
(vqj−pj) ≤ 1(|T ′|−1
di−1
) ∑
T⊆T ′,|T |=di
∑
j∈T
(viqj−pj) ≤ 0.
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Hence, by the rules of FindLoser, we know that if all the losers in LS are sharp envy-
free, all other losers in Aj ∪ · · · ∪ AK are sharp envy-free as well. On the other hand,
for any loser j ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪ Aj−1, since S is a candidate winner set, we know that
dj >
∑
i∈S: i>j
di =
∑
i∈S
di. Since all unsold items are priced at ∞, we know that j is sharp
envy-free. Hence, all losers are sharp envy-free.
5.3.2 Bounding the Number of Candidate Winner Sets
We have the following bound on the number of candidate winner sets.
Lemma 5.10. For any k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} and S ⊆ Ak, suppose d(S) ≤ m. Let
C = {S ∪ S′ | S′ ⊆ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1 and S ∪ S′ is a candidate winner set}
Then |C| ≤
⌊
m
d(S)
⌋
.
Proof. Let a = d(S) and ` be the index of the buyer max(Ak−1). We add buyers
`, ` − 1, ` − 2, . . . , 1 into S in sequence and maintain all the possible candidate winner
sets. Let C0 = {S}. In general, we have constructed Ct containing all the candidate
winner sets of {`, `− 1, `− 2, . . . , `− t+ 1}∪S. We order Ct = {St,1, St,2, . . . , St,nt} such
that d(St,1) ≤ d(St,2) ≤ · · · ≤ d(St,nt) ≤ m. We should prove that d(St,i) ≥ i ∗ d(S).
We now add ` − t into Ct to construct Ct+1. Let ts = max{i : d(St,i) < d`−t}
if {i : d(St,i) < d`−t} 6= ∅, otherwise ts = 0. Let St+1,j = St,j for j = 1, 2, ·, ts,
St+1,j+ts = St,j ∪ {`− t} for j = 1, 2, . . . , nt. Clearly that d(St+1,i) ≥ i ∗ d(S) for i ≤ ts
by inductive hypothesis. And
d(St+1,j+ts) = d(St,j) + d`−t ≥ j ∗ d(S) + d(St,ts) ≥ (j + ts) ∗ d(S).
Let nt+1 = max{i : d(St+1,i) ≤ m}. Clearly the claim follows for `− t and Ct.
The lemma follows by the condition m ≥ d(S`,n`) ≥ n` ∗ d(S).
5.3.3 Optimal Winner Sets
Definition 5.3.2 (Optimal Winner Set). A subset of buyers S is called an optimal
winner set if there is a revenue maximizing sharp envy-free solution (p,X) such that S
is its set of winners.
Proposition 5.11. Let S be an optimal winner set and let k = max{r | Ar ∩ S 6= ∅}.
For any S′ ⊆ Ak, if d(S′) = d(S ∩ Ak), then S′ ∪ (S\Ak) is an optimal winner set as
well.
Before proving the proposition, we first establish the following claim.
Claim 5.3.1. Suppose there exists a revenue-maximizing sharp envy-free solution (p,X),
and let S be the winning set in (p,X), and let k = max{r | Ar ∩ S 6= ∅}. Then every
buyer in Ak has utility zero.
Chapter 5. Envy-free Multi-unit Models 54
Proof. Of course, every loser in Ak has utility zero. To show that every winner in Ak
has utility zero, we show that if such a winner has positive utility, then prices can be
raised to the point where his utility becomes zero, while maintaining sharp envy-freeness
(contradicting the assumption that (p,X) maximizes revenue).
Let imax = max(S). Let
δ =
uimax(p,X)
dimax
.
We claim that (p + δ,X) is an sharp envy-free solution as well, where the price of each
item is increased by δ.
Obviously we have δ ≥ 0, and the conclusion holds trivially if δ = 0. Suppose δ > 0.
For the tuple (p + δ,X), since all items have their prices increased by the same amount,
all losers are still sharp envy-free and all winners would not envy the items they don’t
get. Hence, we need only to check that each winner still gets a non-negative utility.
For imax, we have uimax(p + δ,X) = 0. For any other winner i 6= imax, it holds that
vi ≥ vimax . Since i does not envy any item in (p,X), for any item j′ ∈ Xi and j ∈ Ximax ,
it holds that viqj′ − pj′ ≥ viqj − pj , hence, pj′ ≤ vi(qj′ − qj) + pj . Then, we get
pj′ ≤
∑
j∈Ximax (vi(qj′ − qj) + pj)
dimax
= viqj′ −
∑
j∈Ximax (viqj − pj)
dimax
.
This implies that
pj′ + δ ≤ viqj′ −
∑
j∈Ximax
(
(viqj − pj)− (vimaxqj − pj)
)
dimax
= viqj′ −
∑
j∈Ximax (vi − vimax)qj
dimax
≤ viqj′ .
Hence, ui(p + δ,X) =
∑
j′∈Xi(viqj′ − pj′ − δ) ≥ 0. Therefore, (p + δ,X) is an envy-free
solution.
We are now ready for the proof of Proposition 5.11.
Proof of Proposition 5.11. Since S is an optimal winner set, there is an optimal sharp
envy-free solution (p,X) such that S = {i | Xi 6= ∅}. We construct a new allocation X′
with winner set S′ ∪ (S\Ak) as follows:
• For any i /∈ Ak, X ′i = Xi.
• For any i ∈ Ak \ S′, X ′i = ∅.
• For all the buyers in S′, allocate items in ⋃i∈S∩Ak Xi to them arbitrarily. (The
allocation is feasible as d(S′) = d(S ∩Ak).)
Obviously, (p,X′) generates the same revenue as (p,X). We claim that (p,X′) is an
envy-free solution (this implies our desired result that S′ ∪ (S\Ak) is an optimal winner
set). For any buyer i /∈ Ak, since prices are not changed, i is still sharp envy-free.
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Next we prove that all buyers i ∈ Ak are sharp envy-free in (p,X′). Let J =
∪i∈S∩AkXi be the set of items allocated to buyers in Ak; we also have J = ∪i∈S′X ′i.
Suppose first that |S ∩ Ak| = |S′| = 1; in this case (p,X) differs trivially from (p,X′),
so (p,X′) is sharp envy-free.
Alternatively, there is some buyer i¯ ∈ Ak with di¯ < d(S ∩ Ak). We show that
any item j ∈ J allocated to i ∈ Ak in (p,X′), affords zero utility to i, i.e. j satisfies
viqj = pj . Let v be the value shared by all i ∈ Ak, i.e. v = vi for any i ∈ Ak. Since
(p,X) is sharp envy-free, we have using Claim 5.3.1 that ui(p,X) = 0 for all i ∈ Ak,
hence
∑
j∈J vqj − pj = 0. Suppose some j ∈ J does not satisfy vqj − pj = 0. Arrange
all j ∈ J in descending order of vqj − pj . Any proper prefix P of this sequence satisfies∑
j∈P vqj − pj > 0. Then buyer i¯ envies this prefix.
5.3.4 Maximizing Revenue for a Given Set of Winners and Allocated
Items
Suppose that S is a candidate winner set and T is a subset of items, where |T | = d(S).
We want to know if there is an envy-free solution such that S is the set of winners and
S wins items in T ; if yes, we want to find one that maximizes revenue. This problem
can be solved easily by a linear program with an exponential number of constraints for
each i ∈ S. The following combinatorial algorithm does the same thing; the idea inside
is critical to our main algorithm.
We will use the following notations: S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} with i1 < i2 < · · · < it and
T = {j1, j2, . . . , j`} with j1 < j2 < · · · < j`. Let ib(s) be the winner of js, s = 1, 2, . . . , `.
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MaxRevenue(S, T ): Input a candidate winner set S and a subset of items T
where |T | = d(S)
• Let LS = FindLoser(S).
• Allocation X
– Let Xi ← ∅, for each buyer i /∈ S.
– Allocate items in T to buyers in S according to the following rule
(by Lemma 4.11):
Buyers with smaller indices obtain items with smaller indices.
• Price p
– Let Y = ∅
– For each item j /∈ T, let pj =∞.
– For each item k ∈ Xit, do the following
(a) Let J be the last 2∆ items with the largest indices in T. Run
the following linear program (denoted by LP(k)), which computes
prices for items in Xit−1 ∪Xit
min vit−1qk − pk
s.t. vit−1qk − pk ≥ vit−1qj − pj ∀ j ∈ Xit (1)∑
j∈Xit
(vitqj − pj) = 0 (2)
vit−1qj − pj = vit−1qk − pk ∀ j ∈ Xit−1 (3)
vitqj − pj ≤ vitqj′ − pj′ ∀ j ∈ Xit−1 , j′ ∈ Xit (4)∑
j∈J′(viqj − pj) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ LS, J ′ ⊆ J with |J ′| = di (5)
pjs = vb(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1 ∀js ∈ J −Xit −Xit−1 (6)
(b) If the LP(k) in (a) has a feasible solution, let Y ← Y ∪ {k}.
(c) For each item js ∈ Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪Xit−2 in the reverse order
∗ let pjs = vib(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1
(d) Denote the price vector computed above by p(k).
• If Y = ∅, return that there is no price vector p such that (p,X) is sharp
envy-free.
• Otherwise,
– Let k∗ ∈ Y have the largest total revenue for which (p(k∗),X) is an
envy-free solution.
– Output the tuple (p(k
∗),X) .
Remark 5.12. It should be noting that in LP k, the objective function is equivalent to
maximize pk. By the pricing rule (2), (3), (6) and (c) of MaxRevenue(S, T ), the total
revenue
∑
j∈T pj obtained is a linear increasing function of pk, hence maximizing pk is
equivalent to maximizing the total revenue.
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We establish the following properties:
Proposition 5.13. Let (p,X) is computed in terms of LP(k
∗) where k∗ ∈ Xit in
MaxRevenue(S, T ). Let ib(u) be the winner of ju. Use the convention j`−dit+1 = k
∗.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , l − dit, we have
1. vib(i)qji+1 − pji+1 ≥ 0;
2.
pji
qji
≥ pji+1qji+1 ;
3. pji ≥ pji+1.
Proof. For the first inequality, consider the last case, vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ 0. Assume it
does not hold. By Formula (1) in Algorithm MaxRevenue,
∑
j∈Xit (vit−1qj − pj) < 0.
Therefore,
∑
j∈Xit (vitqj−pj) < 0, which contradicts Formula (2). Further, viuqk∗−pk∗ ≥
0 for all u : 1 ≤ u ≤ t− 1. That is, all other buyers have nonnegative utility on item k∗.
Now consider s = 1, 2, . . . , `− dit . By (6) and (c) in the algorithm, using the convention
j`−dit+1 = k
∗, item 1 holds as following
vb(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1 ≥ vb(s+1)qjs+1 − pjs+1 = vb(s+1)qjs+2 − pjs+2 ≥ · · · ≥ vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ 0.
For the second inequality, by pricing rule (c), we know that
pji
qji
≥ pji+1
qji+1
holds if and only if
vib(i)(qji − qji+1) + pji+1
qji
≥ pji+1
qji+1
which holds if and only if
(vib(i)qji+1 − pji+1)(qji − qji+1) ≥ 0,
which follows from the first inequality.
The third inequality follows immediately from the second one and the non-increasing
ordering of q’s.
Lemma 5.14. Suppose that S is a candidate winner set and T is a subset of items, where
|T | = d(S). Let X be the allocation computed in the procedure MaxRevenue(S, T ).
Then MaxRevenue(S, T ) determines whether there exists a price vector p such that
(p,X) is a sharp envy-free solution, and if the answer is ‘yes’, it outputs one that
maximizes total revenue given the allocation X.
Proof. Assume that there is a price vector p′ such that (p′,X) is a revenue maximizing
sharp envy-free solution, with the winner set S and the sold item set T . In one direction,
we prove that the algorithm given the input sets S and T returns a solution with at
least the same total revenue. On another direction, we prove that the solution found by
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the Algorithm is an envy-free solution for the fixed sets S and T . By Remark 5.12, this
sharp envy-free solution must be an optimal one. The two parts together complete the
proof.
For the first direction, let S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} with vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vit and T =
{j1, j2, . . . , jl} with qj1 ≥ qj2 ≥ · · · ≥ qjl . By Claim 5.3.1,
∑
j∈Xit (vitqj − p
′
j) = 0.
Consider an item k′ = arg maxk∈Xit (vit−1qk − p′k). Define a new price vector p as
follows:
• For j ∈ Xit , pj = p′j .
• For j ∈ Xit−1 , pj = vit−1(qj − qk′) + p′k′ .
• For j ∈ Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xit−2 , pj is defined according to Step (c) of the procedure
MaxRevenue.
It is easy to see that the formulas (1), (2) and (3) of LP(k
′) are satisfied for price vector p.
By induction on the reverse order of items, we can show that p′ ≤ p. This implies that
formula (4) of LPk′ is satisfied as well. Further, since prices are monotonically increasing,
all losers (in particular, those in LS) are still sharp envy-free, which implies formula (5)
is satisfied. Formula (6) is automatically satisfied. Hence, p is a feasible solution of
LP(k
′). Hence, there is a feasible solution in the above procedure MaxRevenue(S, T )
for item k′; this implies that Y 6= ∅ in the course of the procedure.
In addition, again because of p′ ≤ p, the total revenue generated by (p,X) is at least
that by (p′,X). By the objective of the linear program, we know that the revenue gener-
ated by the solution at LP(k
′) is at least that by (p,X) Therefore, MaxRevenue(S, T )
computes a revenue no less than that of (p,X).
For the second direction, let (p,X) be the output of the procedureMaxRevenue(S, T ).
We need to show that (p,X) is an envy-free solution. Suppose (p,X) is computed in
terms of LP(k
∗), where k∗ ∈ Xit .
We first claim that all losers are sharp envy-free. By Proposition 5.9, we need only
to check if all the losers in LS are sharp envy-free for (p,X). Since pj =∞, ∀j /∈ T , we
only need to check that all the losers in LS would not envy the items in T .
According to (5) in Step (a) of MaxRevenue(S, T ), for any i ∈ LS , we know
that, for any buyer i,
∑
j∈T ′(viqj − pj) ≤ 0 for any T ′ ⊆ J with |T ′| = di. Choose
T ′ = {j`−dit−di+1, j`−dit−di+2, · · · , j`−dit} ⊆ J (as di ≤ ∆). Let jmax be the largest index
in T ′ such that viqjmax − pjmax ≤ 0. Then, by monotonicity of price-per-unit-quality in
Proposition 5.13, we have
qj1
(
vi − pj1
qj1
)
≤ qj2
(
vi − pj2
qj2
)
≤ · · · ≤ qjmax
(
vi − pjmax
qjmax
)
≤ 0,
and viqj − pj > 0, ∀j ∈ {jmax +1, jmax +2, . . . , j`−dit}.
Hence, for every loser i in LS , its largest di values in the set {viqj − pj | j ∈ T}
are contained in
{
viqj − pj | j ∈ {j`−dit−di+1, j`−dit−di+2, . . . , j`} ⊂ J
}
. Therefore, the
requirement (5) in Step (a) of MaxRevenue(S, T ) would imply that for any T ′ ⊂ T
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with |T ′| = di, we have
∑
j∈T ′(viqj − pj) ≤ 0, which means that i is sharp envy-free.
Hence, all the losers are sharp envy-free for the tuple.
It remains to show that all winners are sharp envy-free as well. Before doing this,
by the pricing rule in subroutine (c), we can easily see that for any iu and j ∈ Xiu
with u < t, there exists item j′ ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qj′) + pj′ . We will use
this particular property to show all winners are sharp envy-free. Since pj = ∞ for any
j /∈ T , it suffices to show that any winner would not envy the items of other winners.
The claim follows from the following arguments.
• All winners get non-negative utility. Formula (2) guarantee that it gets nonnegative
utility for Xit . For any winner iu < it, none has over-priced item. It follows by
the fact that, ∀s ∈ J − Xit , pjs = vib(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1 in the algorithm and
vib(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1 ≥ 0 in Proposition 5.13.
• Buyer it would not envy items won by any other winner iu, where iu < it. We
show this by induction. Formula (4) shows the base case hold (i.e., it would not
envy items won by it−1). Then, for any item j′ ∈ Xit and any item j ∈ Xiu , (notice
that by the pricing rule, there exists k ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qk) + pk),
we have
vitqj − pj = vitqj − (viu(qj − qk) + pk) = (vit − viu)(qj − qk) + vitqk − pk
≤ vitqk − pk ≤ vitqj′ − pj′ ,
where the first inequality follows from vit−viu ≤ 0 and qj−qk ≥ 0, and the second
inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
• For any iu, iu < it, iu would not envy items won by it. Again, the proof is by
induction. The base case iu = it−1, for any item j ∈ Xit−1 and item j′ ∈ Xit , it
holds that
vit−1qj − pj = vit−1qj − (vit−1(qj − qk∗) + pk∗) = vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ vit−1qj′ − pj′ ,
where the first equality follows from formula (3) and the inequality follows from
formula (1). Hence, the base case holds. Next for any j ∈ Xiu and item j′ ∈ Xit ,
(notice by pricing rule, there exists k ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qk) + pk),
we have
viuqj − pj = viuqj − (viu(qj − qk) + pk) = viuqk − pk
= (viu − viu+1)(qk − qj′) + viuqj′ + (viu+1(qk − qj′)− pk).
Since viu − viu+1 ≥ 0 and qk − qj′ ≥ 0, and by the induction hypothesis, viu+1qk −
pk ≥ viu+1qj′ − pj′ , it holds that viuqj − pj ≥ viuqj′ − pj′ .
• Every winner in S\{it} would not envy the items won by other winner in S\{it}.
Use the convention j`−dit+1 = k
∗, recall ∀u, 1 ≤ u ≤ ` − dit , pju = vib(u)(qju −
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qju+1) + pju+1 , then for 1 ≤ s < s′ ≤ `− dit ,
pjs − pjs′ =
s′−1∑
u=s
(pju − pju+1) =
s′−1∑
u=s
vib(u)(qju − qju+1)
≤ vib(s)
s′−1∑
u=s
(qju − qju+1) = vib(s)(qjs − qjs′ ).
Rewrite pjs −pjs′ ≤ vib(s)(qjs − qjs′ ) as vib(s)qjs −pjs ≥ vib(s)qjs′ −pjs′ , which means
buyer with smaller index would not envy items won by buyer with larger index.
Similarly, noting that
pjs − pjs′ =
s′−1∑
u=s
vib(u)(qju − qju+1) ≥ vib(s′)
s′−1∑
u=s
(qju − qju+1) = vib(s′)(qjs − qjs′ ).
Rewrite pjs−pjs′ ≥ vib(s′)(qjs−qjs′ ) as vib(s′)qjs−pjs ≤ vib(s′)qjs′−pjs′ , which means
buyer with larger index would not envy items won by buyer with smaller index.
In all, every winner in S\{it} would not envy the items won by other winner in
S\{it}.
Therefore, we know that the tuple (p,X) is an envy-free solution.
Observe that the computation of Step (a) of MaxRevenue does not depend on the
whole set T . In fact, we only need to know the last 2∆ items with largest indices in
T to check whether Y is empty or not. Therefore, whether MaxRevenue(S, T ) will
output a tuple only depends on the last 2∆ items in T . The prices for those 2∆ items
are determined in one of the linear programs there. Suppose that the last 2∆ items
in T are J and let jmin = min{j ∈ J}, then if MaxRevenue(S, T ) output a tuple
(p,X), we can re-choose any other set Z ⊆ {1, 2, 3, . . . , jmin − 1} with |Z| = `− 2∆ and
run MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), which would always output an envy-free tuple (p′,X′) as
well. Similarly, if MaxRevenue(S, T ) claims that there is no tuple (p,X) which is an
envy-free solution, then MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪J) also claims that no tuple exists. These
observations are critical in our main algorithm Max-EF.
5.3.5 Only the Winner Set is Known
Suppose that we are given a candidate winner set S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} and a set of
items J = {j1, . . . , j2∆} with i1 < i2 < · · · < it and j1 < · · · < j2∆. Assume that
` = d(S) > 2∆. Let Y = {1, 2, . . . , j1 − 1} denote the set of items that have indices
smaller than j1. Our objective is to pick a subset Z ⊆ Y with |Z| = ` − 2∆ such
that the revenue given by MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J) is as large as possible. By Steps (a)
and (c) of MaxRevenue, for the given set of winners S, the prices of the items in
J are already fixed (no matter which Z is chosen). Hence, to maximize revenue from
MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), it suffices to maximize revenue (or equivalently, prices) from
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the items in Z. To this end, we use the approach of dynamic programming to find an
optimal solution.
Consider any subset Z = {z1, z2, . . . , z`−2∆} ⊆ Y with z1 < z2 < · · · < z`−2∆; denote
z`−2∆+1 = j1. Suppose MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J) will output a tuple (p,X). As we
already know that each zj will be allocated to which winner by MaxRevenue(S,Z∪J),
let wj = vi if zj ∈ Xi, for j = 1, 2, . . . , ` − 2∆; further, let w0 = 0. An important
observation is that the values of all wj ’s are independent to the selection of Z. By the
pricing rule in MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), it holds that pzj = wj(qzj − qzj+1) + pzj+1 , for
j = 1, 2, . . . , `− 2∆. Hence, we have
`−2∆∑
j=1
pzj =
`−2∆∑
j=1
`−2∆∑
u=j
(pzu − pzu+1) + pj1

=
`−2∆∑
j=1
`−2∆∑
u=j
(
(qzu − qzu+1)wu
)
+ (`− 2∆)pj1
=
`−2∆∑
j=1
(j · qzjwj − j · qzj+1wj) + (`− 2∆)pj1
=
[
`−2∆∑
j=1
(
j · wj − (j − 1) · wj−1
)
qzj
]
−
[
(`− 2∆)(qj1w`−2∆ − pj1)
]
, R1 −R2,
where R1 and R2 are the first and second term of the difference, respectively. By the
rule of MaxRevenue, the allocation of z`−2∆ (thus, the value w`−2∆) and the price pj1
are fixed. Hence, to maximize
`−2∆∑
j=1
pzj , it suffices to maximize R1. For any α, β with
1 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ j1 − 1, let opt(α, β) denote the optimal value of the following problem,
denoted by DLP (α, β), which picks α items from the first β items to maximize a given
objective (recall that wj is defined above for j = 1, . . . , `− 2∆).
max
α∑
j=1
(
j · wj − (j − 1) · wj−1
)
qzj
s.t. z1 < z2 < · · · < zα, {z1, z2, . . . , zα} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , β}.
The problem that maximizes R1 is exactly DLP (`− 2∆, j1− 1), which can be solved by
the following dynamic programming.
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Solve-DLP
1. Compute opt(1, 1), opt(1, 2), . . . , opt(1, j1 − 1).
2. Compute
opt(α, β+1) =
{
max
{
opt(α, β), opt(α− 1, β) + (α · wα − (α− 1)wα−1)qβ+1
}
if β + 1 ≥ α
0 Otherwise
3. Find a subset Z∗ that maximizes opt(`− 2∆, j1 − 1).
4. Return the output of MaxRevenue(S,Z∗ ∪ J).
The following claim is straightforward from the definition of DLP (α, β) and the
above dynamic programming.
Proposition 5.15. Given a candidate winner set S and a subset J of 2∆ items, the
above Solve-DLP picks in polynomial time a subset Z ⊆ Y with |Z| = `−2∆ such that
the revenue given by MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J) is the maximum if we guessed S and J
correctly.
5.3.6 Algorithm
In this subsection, we will present our main algorithm Max-EF. The algorithm has two
stages: stage 1 is to select the set of possible winners (candidate winners) who will
be allocated items, and stage 2 is designed to calculate all the ‘candidate’ maximum
revenue and presents an optimal sharp envy-free solution and maximum revenue.
The algorithm is described as follows.
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Max-EF stage 1.
1. Initialize D = ∅ (denote the collection of candidate winner sets).
2. Find S ⊆ A1 such that d(S) = max
{
d(S′) | d(S′) ≤ m,S′ ⊆ A1
}
, let D ←
{S}.
3. For k = 2, . . . ,K
• Sort A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪Ak in the decreasing order of their values.
• For each d such that 1 ≤ d ≤ m
– Let S = argmaxS{d(S)|d(S) ≤ d, S ⊂ Ak}.
– Let S0,1 = S, n0 = 1 and C0 = {S0,1}.
– Let ` = |A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1|.
– For t = 1, 2, . . . , ` do:
∗ In general, we have constructed Ct containing all the
candidate winner sets of {`− t+ 1, `− t+ 2, . . . , `} ∪ S.
∗ We order Ct = {St,1, St,2, . . . , St,nt} such that d(St,1) ≤ d(St,2) ≤
· · · ≤ d(St,nt) ≤ m.
∗ We now add `− t into Ct to construct Ct+1.
· Let ts = max{i : d(St,i) < d`−t} if {i : d(St,i) < d`−t} 6= ∅,
otherwise ts = 0.
· Let St+1,j = St,j for j = 1, 2, · · · , ts.
· Let St+1,j+ts = St,j ∪ {`− t} for j = 1, 2, . . . , nt.
· Let nt+1 = max{i ≤ ts + nt : d(St+1,i) ≤ m}.
· Let Ct+1 = {St+1,i : i ≤ nt+1}.
– D ← D ∪ C`.
4. return D
stage 1 of Max-EF is designed to select candidate winner sets one of which contains
exactly the winners in an optimal sharp envy-free solution. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ K ≤ n and
1 ≤ d ≤ m the problem is of one discussed in Lemma 5.10. It constructs C, consisting of
up to md subsets of total size O(
m∗n
d ) in time O(
m∗n2
d ). The total time complexity then
adds up to O(m ∗ n3 logm). Hence, Max-EF runs in strongly polynomial time.
Proposition 5.16. There is an optimal winner set contained in the set D.
Proof. Now suppose there is an optimal winner set W , if W ⊆ A1, then by Proposi-
tion 5.11, the set S selected in above algorithm is an optimal winner set and we are
done. Otherwise, let imax = max(W ); suppose imax ∈ Ak∗ , where k∗ ≥ 2, and let
w∗ = d(W ∩Ak∗). Now consider the k∗th and w∗th round of the for loop. There exists
T ⊆ Ak∗ such that d(T ) = w∗. By Proposition 5.11, we know that (W\(W∩Ak))∪T is an
optimal winner set. By the procedure of the algorithm and Proposition 5.8, the algorith-
m would find all the candidate winner sets with the form C∪T where C ⊆ A1∪· · ·∪Ak−1.
Hence, (W\(W ∩Ak)) ∪ T ∈ D.
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Max-EF stage 2.
5. For each candidate winner set S ∈ D
• Let ` = d(S)
• If ` ≤ 2∆
– For any set J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |J | = `
∗ Run MaxRevenue(S, J).
∗ If it outputs a tuple (p,X), let RS,J ←
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj
∗ Else, let RS,J ← 0.
• Else ` > 2∆
– For any set J ⊆ {`− 2∆ + 1, `− 2∆ + 2, . . . ,m} with |J | = 2∆
∗ Let jmin ← min{j ∈ J}
∗ Choose any Z ← {z1, . . . , z`−2∆} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , jmin − 1}, where z1 >
z2 > · · · > z`−2∆.
∗ Run MaxRevenue(S, J ∪ Z)
∗ If it outputs a tuple
· run Solve-DLP on S and J to get a tuple (p,X)
· let RS,J ←
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj
∗ Else, let RS,J ← 0
6. Output a tuple (p,X) which gives the maximum RS,J.
Since MaxRevenue and Solve-DLP takes polynomial time, and |D| ≤ nm logm, we
know stage 2 of Max-EF runs in polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Since Max-EF takes polynomial time, we only need to check that
Max-EF will output an optimal sharp envy-free solution. By the above analysis, we
know that Max-EF will output an envy-free solution. Since there is an optimal winner
S ∈ D, there exists an optimal sharp envy-free solution (p,X) such that S = {i|Xi 6= ∅}.
W.l.o.g. suppose that the items in T =
⋃n
i=1Xi are allocated to S by the rules of
allocation of MaxRevenue(S, T ) (otherwise, there exists i > i′ and j < j′ such that
j ∈ Xi and j′ ∈ Xi′ , if vi = vi′ , then viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′ and vi′qj − pj ≤ vi′qj′ − pj′ ,
hence viqj − pj = viqj′ − pj′ , then exchanging the allocation j and j′ without changing
their prices would still make everyone sharp envy-free. If vi < vi′ , then by Lemma 4.11,
we have qj = qj′ , then exchanging allocation j and j
′ and their prices would still make
everyone sharp envy-free). If d(S) ≤ 2∆, then by the argument of Lemma 5.14, we know
RS,T ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj . Similarly if d(S) > 2∆, let J be the 2∆ largest values in T , by the
argument of Lemma 5.14 and Proposition 5.15, we know RS,J ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj . Therefore,
the output (p,X) of Max-EF is an optimal sharp envy-free solution.
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5.4 Hardness of Arbitrary Sharp Demand
Theorem 5.17. For the sharp multi-unit demand with viqj valuations, it is NP-hard
to solve the revenue-maximizing sharp envy-free pricing problem, even if there are only
three buyers.
We next prove the NP-hardness result that is Theorem 5.17.
We reduce from the exact cover by 3-sets problem (X3C): Given a ground set A =
{a1, a2, . . . , a3n} and collection T = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} where each Si ⊂ A and |Si| = 3,
we are asked if there are n elements of T that cover all elements in A. We assume that
n ≤ m ≤ 2n− 1; it is easy to see that the problem still remains NP-complete (as we can
add dummy elements x, y, z to A and subset {x, y, z} to T to balance the sizes of A and
T ).
Given an instance of X3C, we construct a market with 3 buyers and n + m items
as follows. Let M = 3nm + 1, L =
∑3n
i=1M
i. Note that L < 3nM3n, whose binary
representation is of size polynomial in m and n. Consider m values Ri =
∑
aj∈SiM
j , for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and rearranging if necessary, let R1 ≥ R2 ≥ · · · ≥ Rm be a non-increasing
order of these values. The valuations and demands of buyers are
d1 = n, v1 = 3
d2 = 2n, v2 =
3n+ 1
n+ 1
d3 = n, v3 = 2
The qualities of items are defined as follows: Let qj = L, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and
qn+j = Rj , for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Obviously, the unit values and qualities are in non-
increasing order, and the construction is polynomial.
Consider the winner set in an optimal envy-free solution (p,X). Since n ≤ m ≤
2n − 1, the possible winner sets are {1}, {2}, {3}, and {1, 3}. There is no sharp envy-
free solution where {2} or {3} is the winner set, since buyer 1 would be envious. It
remains to consider {1} and {1, 3}. If the winner set is {1}, then the optimal revenue
is v1 ·
(∑n
i=1 qi
)
= 3nL where buyer 1 gets the first n items. If the winner set is {1, 3},
it is not difficult to see that in the optimal sharp envy-free solution (p,X), it holds
that X1 = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Suppose that X3 = {j1, j2, . . . , jn} ⊂ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+m}
where j1 > j2 > · · · > jn. Applying the characterizations of optimal sharp envy-freeness
MaxRevenue(S, T ) and Lemma 5.14 in Section 5.3.4, in the optimal solution (p,X)
with X1 = {1, 2, . . . , n} and X3 = {j1, j2, . . . , jn}, we should prove the following claim
Claim 5.4.1.
v1qk − pk = v1qj − pj ∀k, j ∈ X3
proof of Claim 5.4.1. According to MaxRevenue(S, T ), there exists k∗ : n+ 1 ≤ k∗ ≤
m+ n such that (p,X) is the optimal solution of the following linear program (denoted
by LP (k
∗)).
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min v1qk∗ − pk∗
s.t. v1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ v1qj − pj ∀ j ∈ X3 (1∗)∑
j∈X3
(v3qj − pj) = 0 (2∗)
v1qj − pj = v1qk∗ − pk∗ ∀ j ∈ X1 (3∗)
v3qj − pj ≤ v3qj′ − pj′ ∀ j ∈ X1, j′ ∈ X3 (4∗)∑
j∈X1∪X3(v2qj − pj) ≤ 0 (5∗)
Please note that the last set of equations (6∗) in the original LP are not needed since
they are empty under the current restriction of three buyers. We first prove all the
inequalities in (1∗) must be equalities. Suppose it is not true. Then there exists ` ∈ X3
such that
v1qk∗ − pk∗ > v1q` − p`.
Set bj = v1qj − pj , j ∈ X3. From (2∗), it follows that
∑
j∈X3
bj = (v1 − v3)
∑
j∈X3
qj . Take
the average
b¯ =
∑
j∈X3
aj
|X3| =
(v1 − v3)
∑
j∈X3
qj
|X3|
We introduce the price vector p′ = (p′1, p′2, · · · , p′n, p′j1 , p′j2 , · · · , p′jn) such that ∀j ∈ X3:
p′j = v1qj − b¯ and ∀j ∈ X1: p′j = v1(qj − qk∗) + p′k∗ . If we can prove that (p′,X) is still
a feasible solution for LP k
∗
, then p′k∗ > pk∗ (due to bk∗ > b¯ by (1
∗)). It results in a
smaller objective value than v1qk∗ − pk∗ , a contradiction to the optimality of (p,X).
First, (1∗) (2∗) (3∗) follows directly from definition of p′. We need only to check (4∗)
and (5∗). From p′k∗ > pk∗ , ∀ j ∈ X1 p′j = v1(qj−qk∗)+p′k∗ > v1(qj−qk∗)+pk∗ = pj . We
have ∀j ∈ X1: p′j > pj . Hence, the inequality (5∗) holds. To see inequality (4∗), notice
v3qj − p′j = v3qj − v1(qj − qk∗)− p′k∗
= v3qj − v1(qj − qj′)− p′j′
= (v3 − v1)(qj − qj′) + v3qj′ − p′j′
≤ v3qj′ − p′j′ , ∀j ∈ X1, j′ ∈ X3.
Claim 5.4.1 is proven.
By Claim 5.4.1 and the above condition (3∗), we have
v1qi − pi = v1qj − pj , ∀ i ∈ X1, j ∈ X3 (5.1)
By the above condition (2∗),
∑
j∈X3
pj = v3 ·
n∑
k=1
qjk . (5.2)
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Combining (5.1) and (5.2), the total revenue is
R =
n∑
i=1
pi +
∑
j∈X3
pj = v1 ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (2v3 − v1) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk .
Since buyer 2 is sharp envy-free, we have
v2 ·
( n∑
i=1
qi +
n∑
k=1
qjk
)
−R = (v2 − v1) ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (v1 + v2 − 2v3) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ 0.
Therefore, computing the maximum revenue when the winner set is {1, 3} is equivalent
to solving the following program:
max R = v1 ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (2v3 − v1) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk
s.t. (v2 − v1) ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (v1 + v2 − 2v3) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ 0
j1 > j2 > · · · > jn, jk ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+m}, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(5.3)
Considering v1 = 3, v2 =
3n+1
n+1 , v3 = 2, and qi = L, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the program (5.3) is
equivalent to
max R = 3nL+
n∑
k=1
qjk
s.t.
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ L
j1 > j2 > · · · > jn, jk ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+m}, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(5.4)
It is not difficult to see that the maximum revenue (i.e., the optimal value of the above
program) is (3n + 1)L if and only if there is a positive answer to the instance of X3C.
This completes the proof.
5.5 Consecutive Envy-free Solutions
We first prove a negative result on computing the revenue maximization problem in
general demand case. We show it is NP-hard if all the qualities are the same.
Theorem 5.18. The revenue maximization problem of consecutive envy-free buyers is
NP-hard even if all the qualities are the same.
Proof. We prove the NP-hardness by reducing the 3 partition problem that is to decide
whether a given multi-set of integers can be partitioned into triples that all have the
same sum. More precisely, given a multi-set S of n = 3m positive integers, can S be
partitioned into m subsets S1, . . . , Sm such that the sum of the numbers in each subset
Chapter 5. Envy-free Multi-unit Models 68
is equal? The 3 partition problem has been proven to be NP-complete in a strong sense
in [36], meaning that it remains NP-complete even when the integers in S are bounded
above by a polynomial in n.
Given a instance of 3 partition (a1, a2, . . . , a3n). Let B =
∑
i ai/n. we construct a
instance for advertising problem with 3n+1 advertisers and m = B+1+n+
∑
i ai slots.
It should be mentioned that m is polynomial of n due to the fact that all ai are bounded
by a polynomial of n. In the advertising instance, the valuation vi for each advertiser i
is 1 and his demand di is defined as ai and there is another buyer with valuation 2 for
each slot and with demand B + 1. The quality of each slot j is 1. It is not hard to see
that the optimal revenue is nB + 2(B + 1) if and only if there is a solution to this 3
partition instance, the optimal solution is illustrated as follows.
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B+1
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
1︸︷︷︸
unassigned
. . . 1 1 · · · 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
Although the hardness in Theorem 5.18 indicates that finding the optimal revenue
for general demand in polynomial time is impossible , however, it doesn’t rule out the
very important case where the demand is uniform, e.g. di = d. We assume slots are
in a decreasing order from top to bottom, that is, q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qm . The result is
summarized as follows.
Theorem 5.19. There is a polynomial time algorithm to compute the consecutive envy-
free solution when all the buyers have the same demand and slots are ordered from top
to bottom.
The proof of Theorem 5.19 is based on (consecutive) bundle envy-free solutions, in
fact we will prove the (consecutive) bundle envy-free solution is also a consecutive envy-
free solution by defining price of items properly. Thus, we need first give the result
on (consecutive) bundle envy-free solutions. Suppose d is the uniform demand for all
the buyers. Let Ti be the slot set allocated to buyer i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Let Pi be the
total payment of buyer i and pj be the price of slot j. Let ti denote the total qualities
obtained by buyer i, e.g. ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj and αi = ivi − (i− 1)vi−1, ∀i ∈ [n].
Theorem 5.20. The revenue maximization problem of (consecutive) bundle envy-freeness
is equivalent to solving the following LP.
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
αiti
s.t. t1 ≥ t2 ≥ · · · ≥ tn
Ti ⊂ [m], Ti ∩ Tk = ∅ ∀i, k ∈ [n]
(5.5)
Proof. Recall Pi denote the payment of buyer i, we next prove that the linear program-
ming (5.5) actually gives optimal solution of (consecutive) bundle envy-free. By the
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definition of (consecutive) bundle envy-free, where buyer i would not envy buyer i + 1
and versus, we have
viti − Pi ≥ viti+1 − Pi+1 (5.6)
vi+1ti+1 − Pi+1 ≥ vi+1ti − Pi (5.7)
Plus above two inequalities gives us that (vi − vi+1)(ti − ti+1) ≥ 0. Hence, if vi > vi+1,
then ti ≥ ti+1. From (5.6), we could get Pi ≤ vi(ti − ti+1) + Pi+1. The maximum
payment of buyer i is
Pi = vi(ti − ti+1) + Pi+1, (5.8)
together with ti ≥ ti+1, implying (5.6) and (5.7). Besides the maximum payment of n
is Pn = tnvn. (5.8) together with ti ≥ ti+1 and Pn = tnvn would make everyone bundle
envy-free, the arguments are as follows.
• All the buyers must be (consecutive) bundle envy free. By (5.8), we have Pi −
Pi+1 = vi(ti − ti+1), hence Pi =
∑n−1
k=i vk(tk − tk+1) + Pn. Noticing that if ti = 0,
then Pi = 0, which means i is loser. For any buyer j < i, we have Pj − Pi =∑i−1
k=j vk(tk− tk+1) ≤
∑i−1
k=j vj(tk− tk+1) = vj(tj − ti). rewrite Pj −Pi ≤ vj(tj − ti)
as vjti − Pi ≤ vjtj − Pj , which means buyer j would not envy buyer i. Similarly,
Pj −Pi =
∑i−1
k=j vk(tk − tk+1) ≥
∑i−1
k=j vi(tk − tk+1) = vi(tj − ti), rewrite Pj −Pi ≥
vi(tj − ti) as viti − Pi ≥ vitj − Pj , which means i would not envy buyer j.
Now let’s calculate
∑n
i=1 Pi based on (5.8) using notation tn+1 = 0, one has
n∑
i=1
Pi =
n∑
i=1
[
n−1∑
k=i
vk(tk − tk+1) + Pn
]
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=i
vk(tk − tk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
vk(tk − tk+1) =
n∑
k=1
kvk(tk − tk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
kvktk −
n∑
k=1
(k − 1)vk−1tk =
n∑
i=1
αiti
We know the revenue maximizing problem of bundle envy-freeness can be formalized as
(5.5).
Since consecutive envy-free solutions are a subset of (consecutive) bundle envy-free
solutions, hence the optimal value of optimization (5.5) gives an upper bound of optimal
objective value of consecutive envy-free solutions. Noting optimization LP (5.5) can be
solved by dynamic programming. Let g[s, j] denote the optimal objective value of the
following LP with some set in [j] allocated to all the buyers in [s]:
Maximize:
s∑
i=1
αiti
s.t. t1 ≥ t2 ≥ · · · ≥ ts
Ti ⊂ [j], Ti ∩ Tk = ∅ ∀i, k ∈ [s]
(5.9)
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Then
g[s, j] = max

g[s, j − 1]
g[s− 1, j − d] + αs
∑j
u=j−d+1 qu
Next, we show how to modify the (consecutive) bundle envy-free solution to consecutive
envy-free solutions by properly defining the slot price of Ti, for all i ∈ [n]. Suppose the
optimal winner set of bundle envy-free solution is [L]. Assume the optimal allocation
and price of bundle envy-free solution are Ti = {ji1, ji2, · · · , jid} with ji1 ≥ ji2 ≥ · · · ≥ jid
and Pi respectively, for all i ∈ [L].
Proof of Theorem 5.19. Define the price of Ti iteratively as follows:
pjLk
= vLqjLk
, for all k ∈ [d];
pjik
= vi(qjik
− qji+1k ) + pji+1k for k ∈ [d] and i ∈ [n]
Now we could see that the price defined by above procedure is still a bundle envy-free
solution. This is because by induction, we have Pi =
∑d
k=1 pjik
. Hence, we need only to
check the prices defined as above and allocations Ti constitute a consecutive envy-free
solution. In fact, we prove a strong version, suppose Tis are consecutive from top to
down in a line S, we will show each buyer i would not envy any consecutive sub line of
S comprising d slots. For any i,
Case 1, buyer i would not envy the slots below his slots.
for any consecutive line T bellow i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by
buyer k (denoted such slot set by Uk) and k + 1 (denoted such slot set by Uk+1 and let
` = |Uk+1|) where k ≥ i. Recall that ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj , then∑
j∈Ti
pj −
∑
j∈T
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + Pi+1 −
∑
j∈Uk∪Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+ Pk −
∑
j∈Uk∪Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑
j∈Tk\Uk
pj −
∑
j∈Uk+1
pj
= vi(ti − ti+1) + vi+1(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑`
u=1
vk(qjku − qjk+1u )
≤ vi(ti − ti+1) + vi(ti+1 − ti+2) + · · ·+
∑`
u=1
vi(qjku − qjk+1u )
= viti − vi
∑
j∈T
qj
Rewrite ∑
j∈Ti
pj −
∑
j∈T
pj ≤ viti − vi
∑
j∈T
qj
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as
viti −
∑
j∈Ti
pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T
qj −
∑
j∈T
pj ,
we get the desired result.
Case 2, buyer i would not envy the slots above his slots.
for any consecutive line T above i with size d, suppose T comprises of slots won by
buyer k (denoted such slot set by Uk) and k − 1 (denoted such slot set by Uk−1 and let
` = |Uk−1|) where k ≤ i. Recall that ti =
∑
j∈Ti qj , then∑
j∈T
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj
=
∑
j∈Uk−1∪Uk
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj
=
d∑
u=d−`+1
vk−1(qjk−1u − qjku) +
∑
j∈Tk
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj
=
d∑
u=d−`+1
vk−1(qjk−1u − qjku) + vk(tk − tk+1) + · · ·+ vi−1(ti−1 − ti)
≥
d∑
u=d−`+1
vi(qjk−1u − qjku) + vi(tk − tk+1) + · · ·+ vi(ti−1 − ti)
= vi
∑
j∈T
qj − viti
Rewrite ∑
j∈T
pj −
∑
j∈Ti
pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T
qj − viti
as
viti −
∑
j∈Ti
pj ≥ vi
∑
j∈T
qj −
∑
j∈T
pj ,
we get the desired result.
5.6 (Relaxed) Bundle Envy-free Pricing with Uniform De-
mand
The concept of bundle envy-free we investigate in this section refers to relaxed bundle
envy-free. To simplify the following discussions, we sort all buyers and items in non-
increasing order of their unit values and qualities, respectively, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn
and q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qm. Recall K is the number of distinct values in the set {v1, . . . , vn},
and A1, . . . , AK is a partition of all buyers where each Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, contains the
set of buyers that have the kth largest value.
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5.6.1 Identical Items
In this subsection, we consider the model with q1 = q2 = · · · = qm = 1 and each buyer
with the same demand d. Let di denote the number of items received by buyer i. Let
αi = ivi − (i − 1)vi−1, ∀i ∈ [n]. Then we have the following characterization of the
problem by ILP:
Theorem 5.21. The revenue maximizing problem with identical item and uniform de-
mand of bundle envy-freeness is equivalent to solve the following integer linear program-
ming:
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
αidi
s.t. d ≥ d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dn
n∑
i=1
di ≤ m,
di ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ [n]
(5.10)
Proof. Denote by pi the payment of buyer i, by the definition of envy-free bundle pricing,
we have
vidi − pi ≥ vidi+1 − pi+1 (5.11)
vi+1di+1 − pi+1 ≥ vi+1di − pi (5.12)
Plus above two inequalities gives us that (vi − vi+1)(di − di+1) ≥ 0. Hence, if vi > vi+1,
then di ≥ di+1. From (5.11), we could get pi ≤ vi(di − di+1) + pi+1. The maximum
payment of buyer i is
pi = vi(di − di+1) + pi+1, (5.13)
together with di ≥ di+1, implying (5.11) and (5.12). Besides the maximum payment
of n is pn = dnvn. (5.8) together with di ≥ di+1 and pn = dnvn would make everyone
envy-free, the arguments are as follows.
• All the buyers must be envy free. By (5.13), we have pi−pi+1 = vi(di−di+1), hence
pi =
∑n−1
k=i vk(dk − dk+1) + pn. Noticing that if di = 0, then pi = 0, which means i
is loser. For any buyer j < i, we have pj−pi =
∑i−1
k=j vk(dk−dk+1) ≤
∑i−1
k=j vj(dk−
dk+1) = vj(dj − di). rewrite pj − pi ≤ vj(dj − di) as vjdi − pi ≤ vjdj − pj , which
means buyer j would not envy buyer i. Similarly, pj − pi =
∑i−1
k=j vk(dk − dk+1) ≥∑i−1
k=j vi(dk−dk+1) = vi(dj−di), rewrite pj−pi ≥ vi(dj−di) as vidi−pi ≥ vidj−pj ,
which means i would not envy buyer j.
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Now let’s calculate
∑L
i=1 pi based on (5.13) using notation dn+1 = 0, one has
n∑
i=1
pi =
n∑
i=1
[
n−1∑
k=i
vk(dk − dk+1) + pn
]
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=i
vk(dk − dk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
vk(dk − dk+1) =
n∑
k=1
kvk(dk − dk+1)
=
n∑
k=1
kvkdk −
n∑
k=1
(k − 1)vk−1dk =
n∑
i=1
αidi
Since
∑n
i=1 di ≤ m, we know the revenue maximizing problem can be formalized as
(5.10).
Let yi = di − di+1, for i ≤ n− 1, and yn = dn then di =
∑n
j=i yj . the programming
(5.10) can be further simplified as follows:
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
iviyi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
iyi ≤ m,
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ d,
yi ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ [n]
(5.14)
Since (5.14) is a special two dimensional knapsack, then there is a PTAS for (5.14)[13].
If d is a constant, a brute force method takes nd time to valuate all the yi’s and gives
the optimal solution.
Remark 5.22. If the demand is sharp demand (which means buyer i would buy exactly
di items or buy nothing), the problem is trivial and the optimal solution can be reached
easily.
5.6.2 Distinct Items with Different Qualities qj
In this subsection, we generalize the model for identical item to different items, where
each item j is associated with number qj representing the quality of the item. Each buyer
i has a per unit valuation vi, hence i’s valuation for item j is viqj . We still consider
uniform demand case where each buyer’s demand is bounded by same d. Let xij denote
variables whether item j is received by buyer i. Denote by αi = ivi − (i − 1)vi−1.
Similarly as uniform demand with identical items, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.23. The revenue maximizing problem with uniform demand and distinct
qualities is equivalent to solve the following integer linear programming:
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
αixijqj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
xijqj ≥
m∑
j=1
xi+1jqj , ∀i ∈ [n− 1]
m∑
j=1
xij ≤ d, ∀i ∈ [n]
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [m]
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
(5.15)
Proof. The proof is identical to identical item case.
Theorem 5.24. The programming (5.15) is NP-hard even if there are only three buyers.
Proof. We reduce the partition problem to (5.15). Given an instance of partition prob-
lem, A = {a1, a2, · · · , am} ,where ai, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m are positive integers, the partition
problem asks whether there is a subset B of A such that the sum of elements in B equal
half of the sum of elements of A. We construct an instance of (5.15) with 2m items,
three buyers with relaxed demand m. The values of buyers are v1 = 10, v2 = 6, v3 = 5
and the qualities are qj = aj for j ∈ [m] and qj =
∑m
k=1 ak for j = m+1,m+2, · · · , 2m.
Noting α1 = 10, α2 = 2, α3 = 3. Clearly, in optimal solution of such an instance, the
item m+1,m+2, · · · , 2m must be allocated to buyer 1. Therefore, optimization of such
an instance is equivalent to the following integer linear programming:
Maximize: (10m
m∑
j=1
aj) +
3∑
i=2
m∑
j=1
αixijqj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
xijqj ≥
m∑
j=1
xi+1jqj , i = 2
m∑
j=1
xij ≤ m, i = 2, 3
3∑
i=2
xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [m]
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 2, 3, j ∈ [m]
(5.16)
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In the optimal solution of (5.16), we must have
∑3
i=2 xij = 1, hence, (5.16) can be
simplified as
Maximize: [(10m+ 2)
m∑
j=1
aj ] +
m∑
j=1
x3jqj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
x2jqj ≥
m∑
j=1
x3jqj ,
m∑
j=1
xij ≤ m, i = 2, 3
3∑
i=2
xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [m]
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 2, 3, j ∈ [m]
(5.17)
It is not difficult to see that (5.17) has an optimal solution (10m + 2.5)
∑m
j=1 aj if and
only if the partition problem has a positive answer.
It should be noticed that the optimization problem (5.15) can be solved by the
following dynamic programming. Let W [i, j, T ] denote the optimal value when there are
i buyers, the total qualities of buyer i is larger than or equals j only items indexed in
T being sold. Noting that the optimal solution of (5.15) is given by W [L, 0, [m]]. Let
M =
∑d
j=1 qj and D = {S|
∑
k∈S qk ≥ j, |S| ≤ d, S ⊂ T}
Solve-IP(II)
1. Compute W [1, j, T ], j = 0, 1, 2, · · ·M, T = 2[m].
2. Compute
W [i, j, T ] =
{
maxSi∈D{αi
∑
k∈Si qk +W [i− 1,
∑
k∈Si qk, T\Si]} if D 6= ∅
0 Otherwise
3. Find Si, i = 1, 2, · · · , L that maximize W [L, 0, [m]].
5.7 Identical Items with Budget (Relaxed Envy-free)
In this section, we adapt relaxed envy-free pricing schemes, which mean the items re-
ceived by each buyer maximizes his total utility. In our model, there are n buyers facing
m identical items. The valuation of buyer i for each item is vi. Besides, buyer i has a
budget bi. We present an optimal solution for this problem, which improves the previous
2-approximate solution [32].
Lemma 5.25. The price of each sold item must be the same.
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Proof. Suppose there are more than two buyers and Lemma 5.25 is not true. The buyer
who receives item with higher price would envy the buyer who receives the item with
low price.
With Lemma 5.25, we first calculate revenues when p = v1, v2, · · · , vn. Now we need
only to consider p 6= vi ∀i case, which is given bellow.
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
min{m,
⌊
bi
p
⌋
}1vi>pp
s.t.
n∑
i=1
min{m,
⌊
bi
p
⌋
}1vi>p ≤ m,
p > 0.
(5.18)
Observation 5.7.1.
⌊
bi
p
⌋
≤ m, ∀i ∈ [n], where vi > p.
The optimization problem (5.18) can be further simplified as follows.
Maximize:
n∑
i=1
⌊
bi
p
⌋
1vi>pp
s.t.
n∑
i=1
⌊
bi
p
⌋
1vi>p ≤ m,
p > 0.
(5.19)
Lemma 5.26. In any optimal solution p∗ for optimization problem (5.19), there exists
i such that
⌊
bi
p∗
⌋
is integer.
Proof. Otherwise, we can increase the price by a small amount achieving high objective
value, contradicting that the price p∗ is optimal.
By Lemma 5.26, to get optimal solution of (5.19), we need only to calculate the
revenue when p ∈ { bij |i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}.
Chapter 6
Simulation
6.1 Simulation
Since the consecutive model has a direct application for rich media advertisement, the
simulation for comparing the schemes e.g. Bayesian optimal mechanism (Bayesian for
simplicity in this chapter), consecutive CE (CE for simplicity in this chapter), consec-
utive EF (EF for simplicity in this chapter), generalized GSP, will be presented in this
chapter. Our simulation shows a convincing result for these schemes. We did a sim-
ulation to compare the expected revenue among those pricing schemes. The sampling
method is applied to the competitive equilibrium, envy-free solution, Bayesian truthful
mechanism, as well as the generalized GSP, which is the widely used pricing scheme for
text ads in most advertisement platforms nowadays.
The value samples v come from the same uniform distribution U [20, 80]. With a
random number generator, we produced 200 group samples {V1, V2, · · · , V200}, they will
be used as the input of our simulation. Each group contains n samples, e.g. Vk =
{v1k, v2k, · · · , vnk}, where each vik is sampled from uniform distribution U [20, 80]. For the
parameters of slots, we assume there are 6 slots to be sold, and fix their position qualities:
Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6}
= {0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3}
(6.1)
The actual ads auction is complicated, but we simplified it in our simulation, we do
not consider richer conditions, such as set all bidders’ budgets unlimited, and there is no
reserve prices in all mechanisms. We vary the group size n from 5 to 12, and observe their
expected revenue variation. From j = 1 to j = 200, at each j, invoke the function EF
(Vj , D,Q), GSP (Vj , D,Q), CE (Vj , D,Q) and Bayesian (Vj , D,Q) respectively. Thus,
those mechanisms use the same data from the same distribution as inputs and compare
their expected revenue fairly. Finally, we average those results from different mechanisms
respectively, and compare their expected revenue at sample size n.
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The generalized GSP mechanism for rich ads in the simulation was not introduced
in the previous sections. Here, in our simulation, it is a simple generalization of the
standard GSP which is used in keywords auction. In our generalization of GSP, the
allocations of bidders are given by maximizing the total social welfare, which is com-
patible with GSP in keywords auction, and each winner’s price per quality is given by
the next highest bidder’s bid per quality. Since the real generalization of GSP for rich
ads is unknown and the generalization form may be various, our generalization of GSP
for rich ads may not be a revenue maximizing one, however, it is a natural one. The
pseudo-codes are listed in Appendix A.
Incentive analysis is also considered in our simulation, except Bayesian mechanism
(it is truthful bidding, bi = vi). Since the bidding strategies in other mechanisms (GSP,
CE, EF) are unclear, we present a simple bidding strategy for bidders to converge to
an equilibrium. We try to find the equilibrium bids by searching the bidder’s possible
bids (bi < vi) one by one, from top rank bidders to lower rank bidders iteratively, until
reaching an equilibrium where no one would like to change his bid. If any equilibrium
exists, we count the expected revenue for this sample; if not, we ignore this sample. All
the pseudo-codes are listed in Appendix A.
Since the Envy-Free solution in our paper only works for the condition that all the
bidders have the same demand, thus, we did the simulation in 2 separate ways:
1. Simulation I is for bidders with a fixed demands, we set di = 2, for all i and
compares expected revenues obtained by GSP, CE, EF, Bayesian.
2. Simulation II is for bidders with different demands and compares expected revenues
obtained by GSP, CE, Bayesian.
Figure 6.1 shows I’s results when all bidders’ demand fixed at 2. Obviously, the
expected revenue is increasing when more bidders involved. When the bidders’ number
rises, the rank of expected revenue of different mechanisms remains the same in the
order Bayesian > EF > CE > GSP.
Simulation II is for bidders with various demands. With loss of generality, we as-
sume that bidder’s demand D = {d1, d2, · · · , di}, di ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we assign those bidders’
demand randomly, with equal probability.
Figure 6.2 shows our simulation results for II when bidders’ demand varies in {1,2,3},
the rank of expected revenue of different mechanisms remains the same as simulation I,
From this chart, we can see that Bayesian truthful mechanism and competitive equilib-
rium get more revenues than generalized GSP.
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Figure 6.1: Simulation results from different mechanisms, all bidders’ demand fixed
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Figure 6.2: Simulation results from different mechanisms, bidders’ demand varies in
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Open Problems
7.1 Conclusion
We study the optimal Bayesian truthful mechanism design issues for the multi-item
auction problem with correlated valuations vij = viqj . We focus on three demand
models, the relaxed demand, the sharp demand and the consecutive demand model.
We develop optimal (revenue) mechanisms for the seller. In addition, for the budget
constrained model (without demand constraints), we develop a 2-approximate truthful
mechanism. We prove that the solution is polynomial time solvable.
Question 7.1.1. A major open problem is to find a constant approximation scheme
when the demand constraints and the budget constraints are used simultaneously.
For discrete distribution, [1] and [6] suggested a constant approximate mechanism for
multi unit auction with budget and relaxed demand constrained buyers. However, their
approach which is based on solving an associated linear program cannot be extended
to the continuous distribution case. Of course, another direction is to improve the
approximation ratio for budget constrained cases.
Our models have potential applications to various settings. E.g. TV ads can also be
modeled under our consecutive demand adverts where inventories of a commercial break
are usually divided into slots of fixed sizes, and slots have various qualities measuring
their expected number of viewers and corresponding attractiveness (see Figure 7.1).
With an extra effort to explore the periodicity of TV ads, we can extend our multiple
peak model to one involved with cyclic multiple peaks.
Besides single consecutive demand where each buyer only have one demand choice,
the buyer may have more options to display his ads. e.g. select a large picture or a
small one to display his adverts. Our dynamic programming algorithm A.1 can also be
applied to this case (Transition function in each step selects maximum value from 2k+1
possible values, where k is the number of choices of the buyer).
Another remarkable extension of our model is to add budget constraints for sharp or
consecutive buyers, e.g., each buyer can’t afford the payment more than his budget. By
relaxing the requirement of Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) to one of approximate
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Figure 7.1: Audience Rating Curve of One TV Channel of China with Several Peaks
in One Day
BIC, this extension can be obtained by the recent milestone work of Cai et al. [11]. It
remains an open problem how to do it under the exact BIC requirement. Further, it is
also interesting to handle it under the market equilibrium paradigm for our model.
We study revenue maximization problem under two concepts: envy-free bundle pric-
ing and envy-free item pricing, which is complementary compared with the recent work
[55]. For envy-free bundle pricing, we suppose the buyer are uniform demand constrains
meaning each buyer’s demand is up to the same number. A PTAS is presented for identi-
cal items and a exponential time algorithm is given for viqj valuations. Besides we show
the problem is NP-hardness for identical items model. For envy-free item pricing, we
present an optimal algorithm for budgets constraint buyer with no demand constraints
for identical items. Our work inspires the following problem, which leaves for future
work.
Question 7.1.2. viqj model. Revenue Maximization with budget no demand con-
straints (or unit demand), consider relaxed envy-free pricing case first, then consider
bundle envy-free pricing case.
Question 7.1.3. How to handle revenue maximization of the case q1 = q2 = · · · = qm =
1, with budget no demand (or unit demand) constraints? PTAS?
Question 7.1.4. How to calculate consecutive envy-free solution when the number of
distinct demands is bounded by a constant number, where the NP-hardness result in
Section 5.5 does not apply to this very important case.
Through out the thesis, our main focus is for correlated valuations vij = viqj except
in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4, we present a hardness result for finding sharp competitive
equilibria of revenue maximization problem for general valuation vij . The valuation we
will discuss in the following paragraph refers to general valuations vij unless specified.
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In fact, for general valuations, as introduced in Chapter 1, for the unit-demand setting,
Guruswami et al. [39] initialized the study of envy-freeness in computer science per-
spective and gave an O(log n) approximation algorithm, and Briest [8] showed that the
problem is hard to approximate within a ratio of O(log n) for some , under some com-
plexity assumptions. Chen et al. [18] provided a polynomial time algorithm to compute
a revenue maximization envy-free pricing when there is a metric space behind all items.
One of major open problems is the following:
Question 7.1.5. How to generalize the results on envy-freeness for unit demand model
to multi-unit demand model (including generalization of hardness result)?
The work of Chen et al. [18] can be viewed as one direction of generalization to
answer open problem 7.1.5. Our results of relaxed/sharp/consecutive demand concepts
can also be viewed as other generalization of open problem 7.1.5. Another accompanied
open problem should be the following:
Question 7.1.6. How to generalize the results on envy-freeness for unit demand model
to the same setting with budget constraints (including generalization of hardness result)?
The study of Kempe et al. [44] and Devanur et al. [27] can be viewed as a general-
ization to solve problem 7.1.6.
Another streams of general valuations are competitive equilibria. Chen et al. [16] s-
tudies competitive equilibrium on unit demand matching market with budget constraints
(e.g. utility function has one discontinuity point) and consistent conditions for the utili-
ty function and propose a strongly polynomial time algorithm to determine whether the
equilibrium exists or not and output the minimum one if one does. One open problem
should be the following:
Question 7.1.7. How to generalize the results of Chen et al. [16] to multi-unit case
with budget constraints?
Chen et al. [15] study a Nash dynamic process for unit demand auction model
in matching market using maximum competitive equilibrium mechanism. They proved
that the aligned best response always converges and converges to a minimum competitive
equilibrium of truthful bidding of each buyer. Hence, we would like to investigate Nash
dynamic process for our envy-free case under envy-free mechanisms.
Question 7.1.8. How to do Nash dynamics under envy-free mechanism framework?
For the problem 7.1.8, as far as we know, there is no literature studying this interest-
ing problem. Convergence or uniqueness or converging results of Nash dynamics under
envy-free framework would be very interesting.

Appendix A
Pseudo-code
A.1 Pseudo-code of Simulation
We present the pseudo codes of simulation in Chapter 6.
A.1.1 Expected Revenue for Bayesian Truthful Mechanism (See Sec-
tion 3.5 of Chapter 3)
Suppose with loss of generality, b1 > b2 > . . . > bn > 10, and q1 > q2 > . . . > qn, let
φi(vi) = 2vi − bi − 10.
Algorithm 2: Bayesian Expected Revenue
Input: Demands di, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi, number of samples K
Output: Expected Revenue R
1 Generate uniform distribution for bi as Ii uniformly distributed on
Ii = [bi − 10, bi + 10];
2 Repeat ;
3 for r = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
4 Generate vri from Ii independently, i = 1, 2, · · · , n;
5 Calculate φi(v
r
i ) and sort it decreasing order as φ
′
i(v
r
i ) > φ
′
i+1(v
r
i ),
i = 1, 2, · · · , n;
6 Use dynamic programming
g[s, r] = max

g[s− 1, r]
g[s− 1, r − ds] + φ′s(vrs)
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
(A.1)
By tracking dynamic programming find allocation Xi;
7 Calculate Rr =
∑
i φi(v
r
i )
∑
j∈Xi qj
8 end
9 return R = 1K
∑K
r=1R
r;
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The following the sub algorithm for finding the allocations Xi when φi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n
are known.
Algorithm 3: sharp
Input: virtual surplus φi qualities qj
Output: Allocation xij
1 Sort buyers i in decreasing order of φi;
2 g[i, j]← −∞; g[0, 0]← 0;
3 u[i, j]← 0; xij ← 0;
4 for each buyer i with positive φi do
5 for each item j do
6 tmp← g[i− 1, j − di] +
∑j
k=j−di+1 φiqk;
7 g[i, j]← g[i− 1, j];
8 if g[i, j] < tmp then
9 u[i, j]← 1;
10 g[i, j]← tmp;
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 g[i∗, j∗] = maxi,j{g[i, j]};
15 while i∗ > 0 do
16 if u[i∗, j∗] = 1 then
17 for each item k from j∗ − di∗ + 1 to j∗ do
18 xi∗,k ← 1;
19 end
20 j∗ ← j∗ − di∗ ;
21 end
22 i∗ ← i∗ − 1;
23 end
24 return x;
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A.1.2 Revenue from Competitive Equilibrium (See Section 4.5 of Chap-
ter 4)
Suppose q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ · · · ≥ qn
Algorithm 4: Sub-algorithm for CE denoted by CE(d,q,b)
Input: Demands di, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi
Output: Equilibrium (X,p)
1 Sort the bids bi in decreasing order e.g. b1 > b2 > · · · > bn;
2 Use dynamic programming
g[s, r] = max

g[s− 1, r]
g[s− 1, r − ds] + bs
∑r
j=r−ds+1 qj
(A.2)
By tracking dynamic programming find allocation X;
3 Using following LP to settle price p;
4 Let Ti be any consecutive number of di slots, for all i ∈ [n];
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Xi
pj
s.t. pj ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ [m]
pj = 0 ∀ j /∈ ∪i∈[n]Xi∑
j∈Xi
(viqj − pj) ≥
∑
j′∈Ti
(viqj′ − pj′) ∀ i ∈ [n]∑
j∈Xi
(viqj − pj) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
if LP has a feasible solution then
5 return (X,p)
6 end
7 else
8 return null;
9 end
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Algorithm 5: Main Algorithm for CE
Input: Demands di, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi, Accuracy , biding times K
Output: R revenue
1 b1i = bi, vi = bi i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2 invoke Sub-algorithm for CE on (d, q, b1),
3 if output is not null then
4 Suppose the output is (X,p)
5 calculate the utility for all i. e.g. ui = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj −
∑
j∈Xi pj
6 end
7 for r = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
8 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n do
9 let M ri = bbri /c;
10 for tri = , 2, · · · ,M ri ∗  do
11 invoke Sub-algorithm for CE on input (d, q, (tri , b
r
−i))
12 if the output is not null then
13 Suppose the output is (X,p)
14 Calculate the current utility u = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj −
∑
j∈Xi pj
15 if u > ui then
16 let ui = u and b
r+1
i = t
r
i , b
r
i = t
r
i .
17 end
18 else
19 br+1i = b
r
i ;
20 end
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 Rr =
∑
j pj
25 end
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A.1.3 Revenue from generalized GSP (See more details in Chapter 6)
Algorithm 6: Algorithm GSP
Input: Demands di, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi, Accuracy , biding times K
Output: R revenue
1 b1i = bi, vi = bi i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2 Suppose the allocation of GSP is X = sharp(b, q);
3 calculate the utility for all i. e.g. ui = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj −
∑
j∈Xi pj
4 for r = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
5 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n do
6 let M ri = bbri /c;
7 for tri = , 2, · · · ,M ri ∗  do
8 Suppose the output of GSP on (d, q, (tri , b
r
−i)) is (X,p)
9 Calculate the current utility u = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj −
∑
j∈Xi pj of bidder i
10 if u > ui then
11 let ui = u and b
r+1
i = t
r
i b
r
i = t
r
i .
12 end
13 else
14 br+1i = b
r
i ;
15 end
16 end
17 end
18 return Rr =
∑
j pj
19 end
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A.1.4 Revenue from Envy-free Solution (See Section 5.5 of Chapter 5)
Suppose q1 ≥ q2 ≥ q3 ≥ · · · ≥ qn
Algorithm 7: Sub-algorithm for EF denoted by EF(d,q,b)
Input: Demands d, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi
Output: Equilibrium (X,p)
1 Sort the bids bi in decreasing order e.g. b1 > b2 > · · · > bn;
2 Use dynamic programming (similar as sharp) (initial values g[0, 0] = 0,
g[1, r] = −∞, r ≤ d)
g[s, r] = max

g[s, r − 1]
g[s− 1, r − d] + bs
∑r
j=r−d+1 qj
(A.3)
By tracking dynamic programming find allocation X;
3 The payment of buyers are P, where Pi is the payment of buyer i ;
4 Pn = bn
∑
j∈Xn qj , and Pi = bi(
∑
j∈Xi qj −
∑
j∈Xi+1 qj) + Pi+1 for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1
Appendix A. Pseudo Codes of Simulation 91
Algorithm 8: Main Algorithm for EF
Input: Demands d, qualities (CTR) qj and bids bi, Accuracy , true value vi,
biding times K
Output: R revenue
1 b1i = bi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2 invoke Sub-algorithm for EF on (d, q, b1),
3 if output is not null then
4 Suppose the output is (X,P)
5 calculate the utility for all i. e.g. ui = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj − Pi
6 end
7 for r = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
8 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n do
9 let M ri = bbri /c;
10 for tri = , 2, · · · ,M ri ∗  do
11 invoke Sub-algorithm for EF on input (d, q, (tri , b
r
−i))
12 if the output is not null then
13 Suppose the output is (X,P)
14 Calculate the current utility u = vi
∑
j∈Xi qj − Pi
15 if u > ui then
16 let ui = u and b
r+1
i = t
r
i , b
r
i = t
r
i .
17 end
18 else
19 br+1i = b
r
i ;
20 end
21 end
22 else
23 br+1i = b
r
i ;
24 end
25 end
26 end
27 Rr =
∑
i Pi
28 end
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